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b. Following the above, briefed on the "Defection" air strikes (particularly that they were now scheduled for D-2 Day vice D-3), current status of plan, and current status of DOD support.

8. 16 April 1961 -

The SecDef and JCS were briefed on the situation covering the following key points:

- a. Status of the movement of the CEF
- b. Failure to land DIAZ group at Oriente
- c. Report on "Defection Strikes" on 15 April and known results of these strikes
- d. Status of DOD logistic support

9. 17 April 1961 -

The JCS were briefed on the known situation as of 1000 R.

10. 19 April 1961 -

The JCS were briefed on the known situation as of 1000 R.

David W. Gray
DAVID W. GRAY
Major General, USA
Chief, Subsidiary
Activities Division, J-5

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24 January 1961

2nd Meeting

4 January 1961 Tab A

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

SUBJECT : Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of
Strike Operations Against Government of
Cuba1. Purpose:

The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the current status of our preparations for the conduct of amphibious/airborne and tactical air operations against the Government of Cuba and to set forth certain requirements for policy decisions which must be reached and implemented if these operations are to be carried out.

2. Concept:

As a basis for the policy requirements to be presented below, it would appear appropriate to review briefly the concept of the strike operations contemplated and outline the objectives which these operations are designed to accomplish.

The concept envisages the seizure of a small lodgement on Cuban soil by an all-Cuban amphibious/airborne force of about 700 men. The landings in Cuba will be preceded by a tactical air preparation, beginning at dawn of D-1 Day. The primary purpose of the air preparation will be to destroy or neutralize all Cuban military aircraft and naval vessels constituting a threat to the invasion force. When this task is accomplished, efforts will then be directed against other military targets, including artillery parks, tank parks, military vehicles, supply dumps, etc. Close air support will be provided to the invasion force on D-Day and thereafter as long as the force is engaged in combat. The primary targets during this time will be opposing military formations in the field. Particular efforts will be made to interdict opposing troop movements against the lodgement.

The initial mission of the invasion force will be to seize and defend a small area, while under ideal conditions will include an airfield and access to the sea for logistic support. Plans must provide, however, for the eventuality that the force will be driven into a tight defensive formation which will preclude supply by sea or control of an airfield. Under such circumstances supply would have to be provided entirely by air drop. The primary objective of the force will be to survive and maintain its integrity on Cuban soil. There will be no early attempt to break out of the lodgement for further

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offensive operations unless and until there is a general uprising against the Castro regime or overt military intervention by United States forces has taken place.

It is expected that these operations will precipitate a general uprising throughout Cuba and cause the revolt of large segments of the Cuban Army and Militia. The lodgment, it is hoped, will serve as a rallying point for the thousands who are ready for overt resistance to Castro but who hesitate to act until they can feel some assurance of success. A general revolt in Cuba, if one is successfully triggered by our operations, may serve to topple the Castro regime within a period of weeks.

If matters do not eventuate as predicted above, the lodgment established by our force can be used as the site for establishment of a provisional government which can be recognized by the United States, and hopefully by other American states, and given overt military assistance. This may well then be paved for United States military intervention aimed at pacification of Cuba, and this will result in the prompt overthrow of the Castro Government.

While this paper is directed to the subject of strike operations, it should not be presumed that other paramilitary programs will be suspended or abandoned. These are being intensified and accelerated. They include the supply by air and sea of guerrilla elements in Cuba, the conduct of sabotage operations, the introduction of specially trained paramilitary teams, and the expansion of our agent networks throughout the island.

3. State of Forces:

a. Air. The Project tactical air force includes ten B-26 aircraft currently based in Guatemala and at Eglin Air Force Base. However, there are only five Cuban B-26 pilots available at this time who are considered to be of high technical competence. Six additional Cuban pilots are available, but their proficiency is questionable.

It is planned that seven C-54 and four C-46 transports will be available for strike operations. Here again, the number of qualified Cuban crews is insufficient. There is one qualified C-54 crew on hand at this time, and three C-46 crews.

Aviation ordnance for conduct of strike operations is yet to be positioned at the strike base in Nicaragua. Necessary construction and repairs at this base are now scheduled to commence, and there appears to be no obstacle to placing this facility in a state of readiness in time for operations as planned.

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Conclusions:

(1) The number of qualified C-47 crews available is inadequate for conduct of strike operations.

(2) The number of qualified Cuban transport crews is grossly inadequate for supply operations which will be required in support of the invasion force and other friendly forces which are expected to join or operate in conjunction with it in many ports of Cuba. It is anticipated that multiple sorties will be required on a daily basis.

b. Maritime. Amphibious craft for the operation, including three LCU's and four LCVP's are now at Vieques, Puerto Rico, where Cuban crew training is progressing satisfactorily. These craft with their crews will soon be ready for operations.

The **BARBARA J** (ICV), now enroute to the United States from Puerto Rico, requires repairs which may take up to two weeks for completion. Its sister ship, the **BLAIGR**, is outfitting in Miami, and its crew is being assembled. It is expected that both vessels will be fully operational by mid-January at the latest.

In view of the difficulty and delay encountered in purchasing, outfitting and readying for sea the two LCI's, the decision has been reached to purchase no more major vessels, but to charter them instead. The motor ship, RIO ESCONDIDO (converted LCI) will be chartered this week and one additional steam ship, somewhat larger, will be chartered early in February.

These two dates will provide sufficient lift for troops and supplies in the invasion operation.

Conclusion

Parachute canots required will be available in ample time for starting operations in late February.

C. GENERAL. There are approximately 500 Cuban personnel now in training in Guatemala. Remote being achieved in the MNC 20 milking drive now underway in Miami indicates that extraordinary measures may be required if the ranks of the Assault Brigade are to be raised to its planned strength of 750 by mid-July. Special recruiting teams consisting of members of the Assault Brigade are being brought to Miami to assist in recruiting all areas in that city and possibly in other countries, [REDACTED]

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All recruits should be available by mid-January to allow at least four to six weeks of training prior to commitment.

The Assault Brigade has been formed into its basic organization (a quasi-mechanized infantry battalion, including four rifle companies, and a weapons company). Training is progressing to the extent possible with the limited number of military instructors available. This force cannot be adequately trained for combat unless additional military trainers are provided.

Conclusion:

(1) It is probable that the Assault Brigade can reach its planned strength of 750 prior to commitment, but it is possible that upwards of 100 of these men will be recruited too late for adequate training.

(2) Unless U. S. Army Special Forces training teams as requested are sent promptly to Guatemala, the Assault Brigade cannot be rendered for combat by late February as planned and desired.

(3) The Assault Brigade should not be committed to combat in action until it has received at least four and preferably six weeks of training under supervision of the U. S. Army teams. This means that the latter half of February is the earliest satisfactory time for the strike operation.

4. Major Policy Questions Requiring Resolution:

In order that planning and preparation for the strike operation may proceed in an orderly manner and correct positioning of hundreds of tons of supplies and equipment can be effected, a number of firm decisions concerning major questions of policy are required. These are discussed below.

a. The Concept Itself.

Discussion. The question of whether the incoming administration of President-elect Kennedy will concur in the conduct of the strike operations outlined above needs to be resolved at the earliest possible time. If these operations are not to be conducted, then preparations for them should cease forthwith in order to avoid the needless waste of great human effort and many millions of dollars. Recruitment of additional Cuban personnel should be stopped, for every new recruit who is not employed in operations as intended presents an additional problem of eventual disposition.

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Recommendation. That the Director of Central Intelligence attempt to determine the position of the President-Elect and his Secretary of State-Designate in regard to this question as soon as possible.

b. Timing of the Operation.

If Army Special Forces training teams are made available and dispatched to Guatemala by mid-January, the assault Brigade can achieve acceptable readiness for combat during the latter half of February, 1961. All other required preparations can be made by that same time. The operation should be launched during this period. Any delay beyond 1 March, 1961, would be unavoidable for the following reasons:

(1) It is doubtful that Cuban forces can be maintained at our Guatemalan training base beyond 1 March 1961. Pressures upon the Government of Guatemala may become unmanageable if Cuban ground troops are not removed by that date.

(2) Cuban trainees cannot be held in training for much longer. Many have been in the camp for months under most austere and restrictive conditions. They are becoming restive and if not committed to action soon there will probably be a general lowering of morale. Large-scale desertions could occur with attendant possibilities of surfacing the entire program.

(3) While the support of the Castro Government by the Cuban populace is deteriorating rapidly and time is working in our favor in that sense, it is working to our disadvantage in a military sense. Cuban jet pilots are being trained in Czechoslovakia and the appearance of modern radar throughout Cuba indicates a strong possibility that Castro may soon have an all-weather jet intercept capability. His ground forces have received vast quantities of military equip. etc from the Bloc countries, including medium and heavy tanks, field artillery, heavy mortars and anti-aircraft artillery. Bloc technicians are training his forces in the use of this formidable equipment. Undoubtedly, within the near future Castro's hard core of loyal allied forces will achieve technical proficiency in the use of available modern weapons.

(4) Castro is making rapid progress in establishing a Communist-style police state which will be difficult to unseat by any means short of overt intervention by U. S. military forces.

Recommendation. That the strike operation be conducted in the latter half of February, and not later than 1 March 1961.

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c. Air Strikes.

The question has been raised in some quarters as to whether the amphibious/invasion operation could not be mounted with no tactical air preparation or support or with minimal air support. It is axiomatic in amphibious operations that control of the air and sea in the objective area is absolutely required. Our Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable of opposing our invasion must be located and neutralized before our amphibious assault takes its final run into the breach. If this is not done, we will be courting disaster. Also, since our invasion force is very small in comparison to forces which may be thrown against it, we must compensate for numerical inferiority by effective tactical air support not only during the landing but thereafter as long as the force remains in combat. It is essential that opposing military targets such as artillery parks, tank parks, supply dumps, military convoys and troops in the field be brought under effective and continuing air attack. Psychological considerations also make such attacks essential. The spectacular aspects of air operations will go far toward producing the uprising in Cuba that we seek.

Recommendations.

- (1) That the air preparation commence not later than dawn of D minus 1 Day.
- (2) That any move to curtail the number of aircraft to be employed from those available be firmly resisted.
- (3) That the operation be abandoned if policy does not provide for use of adequate tactical air support.

d. Use of American Contract Pilots.

The paragraph above outlines the requirement for precise and effective air strikes, while an earlier paragraph points up the shortage of qualified Cuban pilots. It is very questionable that the limited number of Cuban B-26 pilots available to us can produce the desired results unless augmented by highly skillful American contract pilots to serve as section and flight leaders in attacks against the more critical targets. The Cuban pilots are inexperienced in war and of limited technical competence in navigation and gunnery. There is reason also to suspect that they may lack the motivation to take the stern measures required against targets in their own country. It is established that the success of the operation will be jeopardized unless a few American contract B-26 pilots are employed.

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With regard to logistical air operations, the shortage of Cuban crews has already been mentioned. There is no prospect of procuring sufficient Cuban C-46 crews to man the normal C-46 aircraft to be used in the operations. Our experience to date with the Cuban transport crews has left much to be desired. It is considered that the only satisfactory solution to the problem of air logistical support of the strike force and other forces following in will be to employ a number of American contract crews.

Recommendation.

That policy approval be obtained for use of American contract crews for tactical and transport aircraft in conjunction of the inadequate number of Cuban crews available.

c. Use of Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua.

The airfield at Puerto Cabezas is essential for conduct of the strike operation unless a base is made available in the United States. Our air base in Guatemala is 300 miles from central Cuba -- too distant for B-26 operations and for air supply operations of the magnitude required, using the C-46 and C-54 aircraft. Puerto Cabezas is only 500 miles from central Cuba -- acceptable, although too distant to be completely desirable, for B-26 and transport operations.

Puerto Cabezas will also serve as the staging area for landing assault troops into transports much more satisfactorily than Puerto Barrios, Guatemala which is exposed to hostile observation and landing on route. It is planned that troops will be flown in increments from San Juan to Puerto Cabezas, placed in covered trucks, loaded over the Andes at night into amphibious shipping, which will then immediately return to sea.

Conclusion:

The strike operation cannot be conducted unless the Puerto Cabezas air facility is available for our use, or unless an air base in the United States is made available.

Recommendation. That firm policy be obtained for use of Puerto Cabezas as an air strike base and staging area.

f. Use of U.S. Air Base for Logistical Flights.

An air base in southern Florida would be roughly twice as close to control Cuba as Puerto Cabezas. This means that the logistical capability of our limited number of transport aircraft would be almost doubled if operated from Florida rather than Puerto Cabezas. Logistical support of the strike force in the target would be much more certain and efficient if flown from Florida.

There is also a possibility that once the strike operations commence, conditions would develop which would force us out of the Nicaraguan air base. Without some flexibility of air base with pre-positioned supplies in the United States, we could conceivably be confronted with a situation wherein the Assault Brigade would be left entirely without logistical air support. Supply by sea cannot be relied upon, for the Brigade may be driven by superior forces from the beach area. Such a situation could lead to complete defeat of the Brigade and failure of the mission.

It seems obvious that the only real estate which the United States can, without question, continue to employ once the operation commences is its own soil. Therefore, an air base for logistical support should be provided in the United States. This will offer the possibility of continued, flexible operations, if one or both of our bases in Guatemala and/or Nicaragua are lost to our use.

Recommendation.

That policy be established to permit use of an air base in southern Florida (preferably Opa Locha which is now available to us and has storage facilities for supplies) for logistical support flights to Cuba.

[] _____
Chief, WH/4/PM

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15
23 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: Tasks, Para-Military Plan, Cuba

1. The Working Group assigned to work out the detailed tasks for the planning and conduct of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, and act as members of a Central Office for the operation, has agreed upon the tasks to be accomplished by the representatives of your respective departments and agency. The tasks are set forth for three phases: Pre-D-Day Phase; D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase until Recognition; and Post-Recognition Phase.

2. The tasks for the Pre-D-Day Phase are set forth in Enclosure A hereto..

3. The tasks for the D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase until Recognition are set forth in Enclosure B hereto.

4. The Tasks for the Post-Recognition Phase are set forth in Enclosure C hereto.

5. The proposed time schedule for the Pre-D-Day Phase is attached as Enclosure D hereto.

Department of State Representative

Department of Defense Representative

Enclosures A-D as stated

CIA Representative

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ENCLOSURE A

PRE-DAY PHASE

Department of State representatives will:

- a. Prepare White Paper for Presidential approval.
- b. Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of material — Presidential statements.
- c. Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what "recognition" really means.
- d. Determine action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to Latin American countries - e.g. .

(1) Guatemala

(2) Nicaragua

and other countries, e.g.

(1) United Kingdom

(2) France

e. Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the development of the Free Cuba Government.

f. Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, including possible action in the United Nations or in the Organization of American States.

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ENCLOSURE A

- g. Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established.
- h. Provide policy guidance to USA to support this plan.
- i. Prepare plans for Post-D-Day actions.
2. Department of Defense representatives will:
 - a. Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban Volunteer Force as requested by CIA.
 - b. Prepare logistics plans for arms, ammunition, and equipment support beyond the capabilities of the initial CIA logistics support.
 - c. Prepare plans for provision of support from operational forces as required.
 - d. Prepare letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT and CONAD for support of this operation.
 - e. Keep CINCLANT planners informed.
3. CIA representatives will:
 - a. Establish a Central Office from which Executive Department and Agency representatives will coordinate planning and conduct operations.
 - b. Continue to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and required.
 - c. Assist in the organization of a Free Cuba Government.
 - d. Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual facts and provide information to the President as soon as possible.

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ENCLOSURE A

- e. Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Volunteer Force in Cuba and follow up plans. Execute these plans on order.
- f. Continue to recruit, train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.
- g. Prepare detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal opposition, establishing such control, coordination and support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible.
- h. Exert effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel.
(N.B: The defection of the military commander of the Isle of Pines, or at least officers who could control the Isle, would be particularly desirable.)
- i. Continue detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America particularly his efforts to export revolution.
- j. Support the preparation of a White Paper to be issued by the Free C : Government.
- k. Review cover plans.
- l. Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support requirements.
- m. Review and implement a pre-D-Day psychological warfare plan.
- n. Review Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase.
- o. Intensify UW activities in Cuba.

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ENCLOSURE A

b. Prepare contingency plan for the disposition, if necessary, of
the Cuban Volunteer Force.

c. Prepare final briefing on entire operation.

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1. Department of State representatives will:
 - a. Take such steps as may be feasible for the protection of U.S. citizens in Cuba.
 - b. Execute plans for support of the Revolutionary Council of Free Cuba Government in the United Nations or Organization of American States and to counter communist and/or Castro changes in the United Nations or Organization of American States, as appropriate.
 - c. Lend support to the objectives and actions of the Cuban Volunteer Force and the Free Cuba Government.
 - d. Revise plans as necessary for support of the Free Cuba Government.
 - e. Recognize Free Cuba Government as appropriate.
2. Department of Defense representatives will:
 - a. Provide follow-up logistic support as requested by CIA and/or in accordance with logistics plan.
 - b. Provide support from operational forces as directed.
 - c. Prepare detailed plans to support the U.S. aid plan for the Free Cuba Government for implementation when overt support is given.
 - d. Coordinate support by DOD agencies and commands.
3. CIA representatives will:
 - a. Execute and support over-all para-military plan.
 - b. Inform DOD representatives of logistics requirements.

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ENCLOSURE B

- c. Continue execution of psychological warfare plan.
- c. Be responsible for the continuous operation of the Central Office and present briefings of the situation as required or directed.
- c. Introduce representatives of the Revolutionary Council and of the Free Cuba Government into Cuba at an appropriate time.

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ENCLOSURE C

POST RECOGNITION PHASE

The Departments and the Agency will prepare, coordinate and execute, as appropriate, such contingency plans as may be required and will, moreover, plan for the resumption of their regularly assigned functions in relation to the new Cuban government.

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ENCLOSURE D

TIME SCHEDULE

1. D - 1a

a. Department of State Representatives:

- (1) Complete White Paper for Presidential approval.
- (2) Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the Free Cuba Government (continuous).

b. Department of Defense Representatives:

- (1) Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban Volunteer Force as requested by CIA.

c. CIA Representatives:

- (1) Establish a Central Office.
- (2) Continue to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and required (continuous).
- (3) Assist in organization of Free Cuba Government.
- (4) Continue to train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.
- (5) Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support requirements (continuous).
- (6) Intensify UW activities in Cuba.

2. D - 1b

a. Department of State Representatives:

- (1) Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of material for Presidential statements (continuous).

- (2) Complete plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established.

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ENCLOSURE D

3. D - 10

a. DOD Representatives:

(1) Complete letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT and CONAD for support of this operation.

4. D - 9

a. Department of State Representatives:

(1) Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what "recognition" really means.

(2) Have approved policy position regarding action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to foreign countries.

(3) Complete plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, etc.

(4) Complete plans for Post-D-Day actions.

b. DOD Representatives:

(1) Complete logistics plans for DOD follow-up support.

c. CIA Representatives:

(1) Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

(2) Complete detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal opposition and for establishing such control, coordination and support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible.

(3) Initiate effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel.

(4) Complete review and implement a pre-D-Day psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and post-D-Day phase.

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ENCLOSURE D

(5) Complete review of Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and post-D-Day phase.

5. D - 9

a. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete support of a white paper to be issued by the Free Cuban Government and arrange to have that Government issue same.

6. D - 7

a. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete review of cover plans.

7. D - 6

a. CIA Representatives:

(1) Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual facts and provide information to the President as soon as possible.

8. D - 5

a. DOD Representatives:

(1) Brief CINCLANT and CONAD planners.

b. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete contingency plan for the disposition, if necessary, of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

(2) Complete preparation of final briefing on entire operation.

9. D - 3

a. Department of State Representatives:

(1) Provide policy guidance to USIA to support this plan.

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ENCLOSURE D

b. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America.

b. D-2

a. DOD Representatives:

(1) Complete plans for provision of support from operational forces as required.

b. CIA Representatives:

(1) Present final briefing on entire operation (if not given prior to this date).

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9 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Summary of White House Meetings

28 Jan 61

1. At this meeting the President was given the general concept for the Trinidad operation and directed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluate the plan from a military viewpoint.

17 Feb 61

2. Mr. Bissell discussed the status of planning and preparations. Mr. Bissell also discussed necessity for a decision concerning the surfacing of political leadership. Mr. Rusk discussed the fact that it would be much better to delay any action and to attempt to build up OAS support. He was concerned about charge of aggression in UN. Mr. Berle believed that support could be generated in Latin America but not by 31 March. The President asked if there was anything he could do to develop a political position to support action such as a speech on traditional liberalism in the western hemisphere. He also asked if there was any way the build up of jets and rockets in Cuba could be linked to this operation. Mr. Bohlen expressed the view that Russia would not react if the operation was finished quickly but might react if it dragged on. The President indicated that he would be in favor of a more moderate approach to the problem such as mass infiltration. No definite decisions were reached at this meeting.

11 Mar 61

3. At a meeting with the President, CIA presented a paper which summarized preparations to date for the Trinidad operation. After full discussion, the President stated that he was willing to take the chance of going ahead; that he could not endorse a plan that put us in so openly, in view of the world situation. He directed the development of a plan where US assistance would be less obvious and would like to meet again within the next few days.

15 Mar 61

4. At this meeting the Zapata plan was presented to the President and a full-length discussion of it followed.

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The President expressed the belief that uprisings all along the island would be better than to concentrate and strike. The President asked how soon it was intended to break out from this area and Mr. Bissell stated that not before about D+10. The President was also concerned about ability to extricate the force. The President did not like the idea of the dawn landing and felt that in order to make this appear as an inside guerrilla-type operation, the ships should be clear of the area by dawn. He directed that this planning be reviewed and another meeting be held the following morning.

16 Mar 61

5. At meeting with the President, CIA presented revised concepts for the landing at Zapata wherein there would be air drops at first light with the landing at night and all of the ships away from the objective area by dawn. The President decided to go ahead with the Zapata planning; to see what we could do about increasing support to the guerrillas inside the country; to interrogate one member of the force to determine what he knows; and he reserved the right to call off the plan even up to 24 hours prior to the landing.

29 Mar 61

6. Mr. Bissell discussed the results of photo reconnaissance, the possible use of a small diversionary force of 150 and a plan to obtain key defections. The President inquired whether there had been any statements by Castro indicating knowledge of the plan and answer was in the negative. Mr. Bissell presented the plan as to the disposal of the force in the event the operation was cancelled. The general idea was to bring the force into Belle Chasse, debrief them, give them leave and then reassemble those who wished to continue at some other training base. The President also questioned whether the force could fade into the brush and not look like a failure and also the possibilities of diverting the force while still at sea. Mr. Bissell indicated that if the operation failed, the force would probably have to be withdrawn. At this meeting the tentative D-Day of 5 April was postponed and the next tentative date set as 10 April. The next decision meeting was set as 4 April.

4 Apr 61

7. This meeting was held in the State Department and Senator Fulbright was also present. Senator Fulbright

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spoke out against the plan. The President again indicated his preference for an operation which would infiltrate the force in units of 200-250 and then develop them through a build up. _____ from CIA expressed the belief that landing small groups would merely serve to alert Castro and they would be eliminated one by one. He indicated that a group of 200 was below the critical point of potential to defend themselves. Mr. Rusk expressed his reservation to the plan but Mr. Berle and Mr. Mann expressed their approval. Mr. McNamara also expressed approval of the general concept. The President indicated that he still wished to make the operation appear as an internal uprising and wished to consider the matter further the next morning.

5 Apr 61

8. There was a very small meeting with the President where only Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer and representatives of State and CIA were present. At this meeting the general idea of fake defections and preliminary strikes were discussed. The President indicated approval of the general idea but indicated that everyone should consider further measures overnight and there would be another meeting the following morning.

6 Apr 61

9. At this meeting Mr. Bissell presented the plan to arrest Mas Farer, to seize a B-25 aircraft known to be operating against Cuba and also to seize one or more small boats being used by counter-revolutionaries. All of this intended to show US disassociation with former Batista followers. Mr. Bissell then gave an outline of the planned defection of a pilot on D-3, coupled with air strikes and a D-2 guerrilla landing. This would then be followed by a guerrilla uprising on D+5 in Pinar Del Rio. The President indicated that the council should not be informed ahead of time. Mr. Rusk, when queried by the President, stated that he felt that this plan was as good as could be devised, but that we should now take a look at other questions that might arise. One would be what would the US do in the event there was a serious call for help? Second, what might the Soviets do? The President indicated that Mr. McMillen had been informed of the prospect. The President questioned whether or not a preliminary strike wasn't an alarm bell. The President also asked as to the last date on which he could delay or cancel the operation, and he was told 16 April. He wanted to know what he could do if the operation was called off.

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and was told by Mr. Bissell that the plan was to divert the force to Vieques. At the end of the meeting the President gave the following guidance: continue planning, spread the convoy, provide additional air protection for the Miami area, increase press conferences for Cardona, limit air strikes to essential targets, and diversionary landing was OK. In summary, the President indicated a desire to use the force but he wanted to do everything possible to make it appear to be a Cuban operation partly from within Cuba but supported from without Cuba, the objective being to make it more plausible for US denial of association with the operation although recognizing that we would be accused.

12 Apr 61

10. At this meeting CIA presented a paper which outlined the latest changes for the Zapata operation including the defections and air strikes on D-2. Many questions were discussed concerning training of additional forces, statements, if any, on D-2 operations, how to prevent headlines, and acceleration of internal troubles. The President stressed the necessity for non-association with the US and directed that all training activities being conducted within the US should stop. He was informed that the go time for preliminary operations would be 1200, Friday, 14 April, and for the main landing 1200, Sunday, 16 April.

David W. Gray
DAVID W. GRAY
Major General, USA
Chief, Subsidiary Activities
Division, J-5

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CJA

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31 May 1961

SUBJECT: - What briefing, if any, was given the Brigade or the Brigade's staff on going guerrilla.

REFERENCE: Paragraph F. of Memorandum Dated 22 May 1961.

The following is a summation of actions involving preparation and instruction for contingency employment of the 2506 Brigade in the event elements of the Brigade or the unit in total suffered defeat and were forced to operate as guerrillas.

1. All officers and the original cadre (some 375 personnel) which formed the 2506 Brigade received extensive instruction (in excess of 13 weeks) in guerrilla warfare organization tactics and techniques. It was with considerable difficulty and only after strenuous instruction on conventional operations that the officers of the Brigade were weaned from their marked inclination to guerrilla operations. Many of the unit leaders had in fact operated as guerrillas either with Castro forces in the fight against Batista or in the later operations against Castro after he had seized power.

2. During the evening, staff and operations classes conducted during the Brigade training cycle extending from November 1960 through March 1961, several discussions were held on the subject of a conventional force defeated in the field and forced to continue resistance as a guerrilla element. Circumstances and ways of means of organizing and operating in various parts of Cuba were discussed in detail. These discussions did not cover the Zapata area specifically for security reasons, but covered the other feasible areas to include the Escambrays, Pinar del Rio and the Oriente. These discussions were not covered with any specific direction towards the Brigade operation in these locales, but were

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in the nature of contingency operations planning, i.e., "in the event we suffered defeat and it was physically possible, we would attempt to break contact and retire to a redoubt area where we would initiate guerrilla activities." The stated mission of the Brigade for which it was organized and trained was to land by sea and air and fight a conventional conflict as an organized military force. At no time did the Brigade once organized receive training to fight as a guerrilla force. To have attempted to conduct such training would have detracted from the purpose for which the Brigade was organized and would have been detrimental to morale. An indigenous force of the size of the Brigade cannot be organized and trained in the time allocated to concurrently accomplish both missions (conventional military role and guerrilla force role) satisfactorily.

4. During the pre-staging briefings of commanders and key staff officers at the training base in Guatemala (period 25 March to 7 April 1961) the operation plan (less locale and target date) were briefed to the Brigade Commander, Deputy Commander and S-3. Contingency provision in the event of the defeat of the Brigade involving fragmentation of the unit and attempts to initiate guerrilla operations were discussed. It was mutually agreed that these contingency plans would be discussed only down to the level of battalion commanders prior to the landing to avoid defeatist talk and apprehension concerning success of the operation. These discussions covered both the aspects of an element or elements of the Brigade becoming cutoff from the main body and attempting to break contact with the enemy, and assume guerrilla posture, as well as the possibility of the Brigade as a whole being cutoff from the sea as it advanced inland and the possibility of its assuming a defense in a redoubt area or fragmenting for guerrilla operations. It was mutually agreed that no specific plans for this eventuality could be pre-planned insofar as ground actions were concerned due both to the security provisions prohibiting early briefing of any Cuban personnel as to the specific locale of the landing and the circumstances surrounding the combat action which might lead to an element or the whole of the Brigade to assume such a contingency plan.

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However, the following general provisions governing such operation were mutually agreed to:

- a. Resupply to the Brigade would be primarily by air with secondary reliance on clandestine maritime craft. Drop procedures would be provided for in the Operation Plan.
- b. Communications would be directed to the base control outside the target area by the five RS-1's and seven TPL radios in operation with the Brigade. (Not in the command commo trailer.)
- c. Tactical integrity would be preserved wherever possible and the operational size of guerrilla units would be dictated by the specific local conditions prevalent in the operation area.
- d. Command lines would be preserved with the Brigade Commander or his designated representative, preferably a senior unit commander exercising operational control of specific operational areas.
- e. Local recruits and volunteers would be accepted but the Brigade would maintain the 2506 personnel in command and key positions in all formations.
- f. Local law and customs would be observed, provisions or resources commandeered would be paid for or receipts given.
- g. Terrorist operations effecting personnel other than GOC governmental or military personnel would be avoided.

5. At Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, subsequent to briefing on the target area, these contingency provisions were further discussed with the same individuals (Brigade Commander, Deputy Commander and S-3) with further specifics addressed to the terrain of the Zapata area. The following points were covered:

- a. Red Beach Task Force (2nd Bn, 5th Bn and Co. A of 1st Airborne Bn) would hold Red Beach area in the event Blue

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Beach was forced to withdraw to the north. Blue Beach Force would withdraw to the north along the coast road. Upon junction with Red Beach Task Force at the head of the bay, the Brigade would withdraw to the south and west into the greater Zapata area, breaking contact with the enemy and assuming guerrilla operational status or preparing for evacuation in increments as feasible. Alternate courses of action (evacuation or guerrilla status) were to be implemented as dictated by the circumstances.

b. In the event Red Beach was cutoff by the enemy from contact with Blue Beach, the same course of action was to be followed by the Red Beach Force. If, however, the coast road to the Blue Beach area was open and the Blue Beach Force holding, the Red Beach Force was to retire to the south to effect junction with Blue Beach.

c. Blue Beach Force, if cutoff from Red Beach and capable of breaking out, was to move as appropriate to either or both the following areas bordering Blue Beach and attempt to evade pursuit and initiate guerrilla operations.

(1) The area bounded on the north by El Jiqui and the Jaguey Grande Red Beach road to the northeastern edge of the swamp and thence south to the Covadonga/San Blas road and the road southwest to Playa Giron.

(2) The area to the east and north of Blue Beach bounded by the Playa Giron, San Blas, Covadonga road on the west thence southeast along the edge of the swamp to the western edge of Cienfuegos Bay.

d. It was mutually agreed that this plan might not be feasible if either major force (Red or Blue) were closely pressed by the enemy. Evacuation by sea was deemed undesirable by the three officers concerned who stated that they must fight and win or go down in defeat without recourse to evacuation and that they would not consider or discuss evacuation.

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6. The Brigade Commander prior to embarkation stated that he had discussed the details of this contingency plan with the commanders he considered appropriate. He stated that he considered this plan to be particularly suitable for the small airborne contingents dropping on DZ's 4 and 5 at Jocuma and San Miguel de Pita respectively. This contingency was further discussed with the Airborne Battalion Commander De Valle on the night of 17 April prior to takeoff.

7. In summation it must be stated that little interest or enthusiasm was displayed by the Brigade personnel concerned for any aspect of the plan that involved retreat and defeat, to include this contingency for guerrilla operations plan. It was generally recognized and openly stated by the key officers that any military force involved in an airborne/amphibious landing and subsequent field operations against an enemy defending his homeland would have an extremely difficult time assuming a guerrilla role in any substantive force subsequent to defeat in the field. The defeat itself implied that the enemy in close combat had surrounded or ruptured and destroyed the Brigade as a military force, thus allowing only a fraction of its combat effectives to escape to assume a role as escapees and evaders with a limited potential for later guerrilla operations.

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26 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Maxwell D. Taylor

1. Following is the text of a precedence EMERGENCY cable sent to Col. Jack Hawkins (USMC) at Puerto Cabezas on 13 April 1961 by the Project chief:

(a) Please advise EMERGENCY precedence if your experiences during the last few days have in any way changed your evaluation of the Brigade.

(b) For your information: The President has stated that under no conditions will U. S. intervene with any U. S. forces.

2. Following is the text of Col. Hawkins' reply of the same day:

(a) My observations the last few days have increased my confidence in the ability of this force to accomplish not only initial combat missions but also the ultimate objective of Castro's overthrow.

(b) Reference (Paragraph 1 above) arrived during the final briefing of the Brigade and Battalion commanders. They now know all details of the plan and are enthusiastic. These officers are young, vigorous, intelligent and motivated with a fanatical urge to begin battle for which most of them have been preparing in the rugged conditions of training camps for almost a year. I have talked to many of them in their language. Without exception, they have utmost confidence in their ability to win. They say they know their own people and believe after they have inflicted one serious defeat upon opposing forces, the latter will melt away from Castro, who they have no wish to support. They say it is Cuban tradition to join a winner and they have supreme confidence they will win all engagements against the best Castro has to offer. I share their confidence.

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by MMK NARA Date 4/19/96~~TOP SECRET~~

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(c) The Brigade is well organized and is more heavily armed and better equipped in some respects than U. S. infantry units. The men have received intensive training in the use of their weapons, including more firing experience than U. S. troops would normally receive. I was impressed with the serious attitude of the men as they arrived here and moved to their ships. Movements were quiet, disciplined and efficient, and the embarkation was accomplished with remarkable smoothness.

(d) The Brigade now numbers 1,400; a truly formidable force.

(e) I have also carefully observed the Cuban Air Force. The aircraft are kept with pride and some of the B-26 crews are so eager to commence contemplated operations that they have already armed their aircraft. Lt. Col. George Gaines (USAF) informed me today that he considers the B-26 squadrom equal to the best U. S. Air Force squadron.

(f) The Brigade officers do not expect help from U. S. Armed Forces. They ask only for continued delivery of supplies. This can be done covertly.

(g) This Cuban Air Force is motivated, strong, well trained, armed to the teeth, and ready. I believe profoundly that it would be a serious mistake for the United States to deter it from its intended purpose.

John Dulles

For J. C. KING

Distribution:

Copy #1 - General Taylor
Copy #2 - Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Copy #3 - Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Copy #4 - Col. J. C. King
Copy #5 - Mr. J. D. Esterline

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十一

PROPAGANDA ACTION PLAN IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY FORCES

(D-Day until the fall of the Castro regime)

I

On D-Day the ~~US~~ propaganda campaign will enter its action stage. Priorities will be established by military considerations and all activities directed at Cuba will be in support of military objectives. All propaganda directed to countries other than Cuba will be guided by political action considerations.

The two primary propaganda mechanisms used during the action phase will be radio and leaflet dispersion.

The objectives of the propaganda action phase will be to assist military and political action developments; (.....

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II

THEMES

The basic D-Day themes are reflected in the D-Day leaflet, a draft of which is attached. (Annex A).

Until further information is available, detailed theme treatment of the action phase will not be formulated. However, probable themes are outlined in an attachment. (Annex B).

III

RADIO

(Broadcasts from outside Cuba)

Medium Wave:

-4-

Short Wave:

Radio Swan: Programs described previously will be simulcast or re-broadcast by Swan on short wave. These will be heard in Cuba in spite of any jamming attempts. (The GOC does not have the equipment or sophistication to completely jam this powerful short wave; furthermore, special equipment on the island will allow countermeasures.)

Broadcasting From Within Cuba:

[...] prop teams planning infiltration into Cuba will carry Viking transmitters with them. Hopefully, at least one will be in place and broadcasting truly clandestine programs by D-Day.

The invasion force will be equipped with a Viking transmitter, in the expectation that it can broadcast directly from its denied area within the country. [.....]
[.....]

NOTE: It is possible that following D-Day there will be an interruption in electrical power so that regular radio sets will be inoperative. In any event, it is probable that fighting forces will have to depend on battery or generator-powered sets.

It is planned to provide fighting troops with small transistor battery-powered sets which can be carried in the pocket or on a chain around the neck. Fighting elements with which we are not in contact will be supplied by air drops of transistors hung from brightly colored parachutes. All material drops will contain at least some transistors and battery replacements.

IV

LEAFLETS

Regular pre-invasion leaflet drops will be stepped up shortly before D-Day. Generally, they will stimulate and incite the population for the beginning of fighting, but will tend to mislead on where it will occur.

D-Day Leaflet: This is the key message of the D-Day propaganda operation. The leaflet will have to be concise and yet answer all possible questions for Cuba and the rest of the world. It will be a statement from the military leader (roughly in the form of Eisenhower's D-Day statement).



If a leader is not available, the leaflet must be from the "Consejo" or whatever ruling group is in command.

It is understood that weather, accident, or low priority on available aircraft may preclude the actual dropping of the leaflet. Whether it is dropped or not, the claimed leaflet will be the basis for the first D-Day broadcasts and first treatment of the invasion by the world press. (It should be noted that the possibility of leaflet dropping facilities which could be used but would not deprive PM of aircraft are being investigated.)

The D-Day leaflet must provide terse, dramatic answers to the following questions:

Who comprises the force: (The patriots who have been active within Cuba have been joined by more non-Batista, non-foreign Cubans who are exercising the right to return to their native land).

What will the force do? (Overthrow Castro and the Communists who have enslaved Cuba.)

Why are they going to do it? (For a democratic Cuba, "Pora una sola America".)

How are they going to achieve it? (By joining with all Cubans to carry out war against the tyrant.)

How are those who hear the message to cooperate? (By general instructions to militia, military, civil population.

Steps to be taken against the tyrant, support to be given to the rebel patriots.)

When? (Right now. Until the tyrant falls.)

An Appeal for support must open and close the message, with a dramatic presentation of the battle slogan which will be used in all subsequent m

sages. Probably this can be something like: "To arms! For a Free Cuba and a Single America!"

(See Attachment for draft of leaflet.)

D-Day plus 1 Leaflet: This will be the first specific instruction to the military and militia. Why they must defect. How they do it. What they must do to their equipment or how they can foul up the service that they manage. How they can insure their life, and that of their families. Delicately intimidating, hopefully promising that they can play a glorious role in the overthrow of the tyrant.

D-Day plus 2 Leaflet: This will be the first specific instruction to the general populace. Following the general outline above, with messages geared for women, youth, workers, etc. Civil resistance and production sabotage. What radios to listen to for guidance.

Target of Opportunity Leaflets: Unlike the above three leaflets, which will be prepared beforehand, subsequent leaflets will be written according to developments in the fighting. They may be directed only to the inhabitants of single towns, or to a single army unit. They may be signed by the secondary patriot leader in a particular area. They may be in the form of "amnesty passes" so soldiers can surrender or defect with impunity.

V

USE OF CAPTURED MEDIA

Two newspaper-radio teams are being trained for combat infiltration. The teams will be editorially and technically competent to operate any

captured newspaper plant, or to operate and prepare programming for local radio stations. In addition, the present military force includes a team capable of operating a radio transmitter for propaganda purposes.

VI

GENERAL PROPAGANDA SUPPORT

Should military action be extended over a long period of time, the radio and leaflet operations previously described will be augmented by all the regular propaganda apparatus.

This will be enormously important in influencing the actions of Cuban government leaders and stimulating sympathetic support of the patriotic rebellion from other countries.

ANNEX A

TODAY

THE PATRIOTS WHO HAVE BEEN FIGHTING IN OUR HILLS AND CITIES FOR THE LAST SIX MONTHS WERE REINFORCED TODAY BY AN ARMY OF LIBERATION. THE BATTLE FOR A FREE CUBA AND AN UNDIVIDED AMERICA HAS BEGUN. ADELANTE!

This morning a large force of free Cubans--the same Cubans who once fought to dispose of Batista--have joined the courageous fighters in the hills. It is a force without foreigners, an army of Cubans who are returning to their own country to save the Revolution from atheistic Communism.

The army of liberation has come to topple Castro the tyrant and rout the Communists who have betrayed our country. It will give to the people the freedoms they fought for before but which were taken from them by Castro.

The army of liberation has come for two reasons: for a free Cuba and for an undivided America.

Victory is inevitable if all recent Cubans join the army of liberation in body and spirit. The red tyrants will crumble before the might and wrath of united citizens.

Militiaman:--Now is the time to turn your guns!

Soldier:--Now is the hour to prove your allegiance
to your Country!

Student:--Let the books fall so the tyrant will fall!!

Citizen:--Make the streets your fields of glory!

Let no vehicles run--no wires carry their current--no roads support their traffic--no machines turn--no food get to market--no night be without violence.

Listen to the clandestine radios for your instructions.

THE BATTLE BEGINS NOW. ON THIS DAY EACH CUBAN WILL BECOME A PATRIOT OR A TRAITOR. THE DAY OF JUDGMENT IS AT HAND. NIGHTFALL IS TOO LATE FOR YOUR DECISION. JOIN THE FORCES OF VICTORY SO THAT YOU WILL SHARE IN THE GLORY OF THE NEW CUBA--A FREE CUBA AND AN UNDIVIDED AMERICA.

CONSEJO GENERAL

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.....
.....
ANNEX B

POSSIBLE THEMES FOR D-DAY PERIOD

Cubans reinforcing internal Cuban opposition: -- "We" are non-Batista Cubans. We are not foreigners. We arrive to reinforce existing brave patriot forces already in the hills who have been fighting Cuban government tyranny for many months.

Nucleus of original anti-Batista rebels now anti-Castro: -- We count among us and among those in hills many who were at Castro's side against Batista's tyranny and who are now fighting Castro's tyranny.

Not an invasion: -- This is not an outside, foreign invasion. We are Cubans. We were forced as individuals to leave the house of the tyrant and now are organized and armed and back to help oust the tyrant.

Earlier martyrs paved the way: -- We are but the final and crowning Cuban force to crush the Communist dictatorship. Before us students, soldiers, workers, and other martyrs have already paved the way and shed their blood to make our arrival possible.

Erase scourge of Communism: -- Now that you have felt the heel of a negative Soviet, Asiatic, foreign, Communist regime, you know how necessary it is to erase it forever in Cuba.

Respect for Cuban fighters: -- Don't let the government call us "imperialists" or "mercenaries". You know that we are Cubans fighting Cuba's battle against foreigners like Che, the Soviets, and the Communist Chinese. Whereas, the government crushed some other opposition brutally before, the government leaders now know they have more than met their match. No government propaganda can hide the truth of inevitable victory by Cubans over Communists.

Our military action part of great overall resistance movement: -- While we go about our part of the job, we know we are joining a great wave of resistance by all decent, patriotic Cubans, men and women, to eliminate the cancer and build Cuba anew. Special salute to any visible opposition group at time of D-Day.

Applause of all America. Reunite Cuba and Americas: -- We are not the puppets of anyone, but we have the sympathy and applause of all America, north and south to help redeem Cuba for the Americas.

Those who betrayed original revolution: -- The current government leaders betrayed the people who originally supported the revolution. Let's get that original movement back on the right track. We are not out to destroy the revolution but only to destroy the destroyers of the original revolution.

Today is day of decision, not -- Mark well. Now is the time when all Cubans prove themselves to be patriots or traitors. We will be

.....
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.....
.....
tomorrow:

lenient to all who now show they are really Cubans and aid in the liberation uprising, be they militiamen, government employees, or campesinos. But woe to the traitors.

Religious crusade: -- As the early Christians finally won out over the infidels, so will we. Devout, pray for victory. Recall fish symbol significance.

Batista and
Batistianos far
away:

-- Batista and his chieftains are far away in other lands and have nothing to do with this great military and civil movement. Don't believe government lies on this subject. (Name resistance leaders who obviously non-Batistianos.)

Star versus Star: -- Battle line is clearcut. Cuban star and proud banner versus Soviet red star and the hammer and sickle.

Reassurance to
fence-sitter with
vested interest in
regime:

-- No Cuban now cultivating own plot of land for self and family or living in newly built house in town or country will lose same after liberation. We will always respect honest toil and human rights.

Finish grisly job
of overthrow quickly
and get on to job
of building Cuba:

-- Let's get military job over with quickly so we can heal wounds of Cuban family and build a new Cuba out of ashes.

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16

EYES ONLY

April 25, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Murrow

FROM: Donald M. Wilson *AMW*

Herewith a draft memorandum to General Maxwell Taylor or whomever else you feel might want it:

1. On Thursday, March 30, at a luncheon including McGeorge Bundy, Gilpatric, Dulles, Bowles, Bell, and myself some casual and uninformative remarks were made concerning possible action in Cuba.

2. On April 5 Mr. Donald M. Wilson, Deputy Director of USIA, was invited to breakfast by [redacted]

[redacted] told Wilson that widespread operations were underway for a landing in Cuba backed and planned by CIA. He indicated that the [redacted] had a very full story on the operation which they did not intend to print. Because it was inimical to the national interest, [redacted] saw Wilson in the hope of persuading USIA to authorize an Information Officer in Miami to brief correspondents once the landings occurred.

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3. Armed with this information, I went to see Allen Dulles that night accompanied by Mr. Wilson. Mr. Dulles indicated that preparations were indeed underway, but he gave no indication as to the magnitude or the proposed timing of the operation. In fact, he said it had not been decided then whether it would take place or not.

4. That was the last official word of any kind that USIA received concerning the entire Cuba operation and that word, such as it was, was solicited by me.

5. At 5:34 a. m. on April 17 the Voice of America first broadcast a wire service report of "invasion" of Cuba. During that morning they continued to quote wire service agencies. At 2 p. m. on April 17 the Voice of America — after I had consulted the White House and State — began broadcasting nineteen hours a day in Spanish. The broadcasting included a 15-minute news show every hour on the hour and the other forty-five minutes were taken up with direct broadcasts from the United Nations, the President's ASNE speech, which was repeated many times, statements by other high government officials, and music.

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6. Our other media output was geared to report the "news," such as it was, plus priority handling of important official statements.

7. Previous to Monday, the 17th, we were broadcasting ^(8-10 p.m.) two hours a day in Spanish to Latin America from 8 to 10 p. m.

This meant that under normal programming no broadcast would have gone to Cuba or the rest of Latin America until some fifteen hours after the news of the landings had become public. If we had received advance knowledge of the operation, we could have prepared the Voice and other USIA media to go into action immediately at 5:34 a. m. when the first commercial news of the landings was announced. Instead, some nine hours went by before we were able to get into action. Even then our programming was very sketchy and not nearly as effective as it might have been if we could have prepared in advance for it.

E. R. M.

I:DMWilson:svds Apr 25/61

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18 May 1961

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION

Background for Dissidence

By the beginning of 1961, the Castro Government was strong enough to move toward extending its control in a variety of ways which it knew would increase popular disaffection and resentment. The regime, having already confiscated most major firms, large farms, and organized a peoples' militia to counter-balance the army, was now ready to further extend its power over the economic, social, and personal life of the individual Cuban.

Security Controls. In January 1961, the creation of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, a block-warden type of informant system, placed practically every Cuban citizen under the watchful eye of a State informer. This was added to an already effective system whereby agents of the G-2 (the secret police) worked with the National Revolutionary Police in every city and town, while, in the rural area, mobile rural police units, cooperating with the G-2 and the militia, covered the countryside. The Cuban security apparatus, under the direction of local Communists and with the guidance of Soviet Bloc intelligence officers, gave evidence of developing into a sophisticated intelligence organization. The creation of an additional, wholly

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by MMK NARA Date 10/3/94

self-contained G-2 control, under the direction of a Bloc intelligence officer, represented a further development of a police state apparatus.

Labor. Organized labor, which under Batista had achieved a position of wide political and economic influence, was by mid-1960 under Communist control, and the workers were becoming increasingly restive under the new restrictions and obligations. Employees now worked longer hours for less pay. For example, the sugar workers, who began the harvest in January, 1961, were ordered to work 16 hours a day at 50% reduction in salary. They also served in the militia without pay. They "voluntarily" contributed their leisure time and part of their salary for governmental projects. They were controlled by limitations on job transfers and travel restrictions from city to city.

Youth. The opening in February, 1961, of child nurseries (for ages one to six) and the formation in April, 1961, of a militant Association of Pioneers (for ages seven to thirteen), which added to the youth organizations already in existence, placed virtually every youth in the one-to-twenty-five age category in the hands of a government-controlled youth organization, where they could be indoctrinated with revolutionary zeal for the regime and weaned away from parental and religious influence.

Education. The much-publicized educational program for the year 1961, in which illiterates are to be taught to read and write from Communist-oriented primers, by teachers, many of whom are teen-agers who have spent three to six months in the Sierra Maestra undergoing Communist indoctrination, was presented by the regime as a magnificent step forward and 1961 was officially proclaimed the "Year of Education." The training of such

teachers began in late 1960 in order to despatch them in April, 1961, to all corners of the island seeking out the illiterates. Many realistic Cubans viewed the movement as a means of subjecting the illiterate peasant, the only remaining uncontrolled and the most individualistic element of the population, to indoctrination and to the informer system. The older, professional teachers became increasingly apprehensive that their positions under the Communist-dominated education system would soon be taken over by these young pro-regime teachers.

Economic. The creation in March, 1960, of an economic czar, Che Guevara, merely served to emphasize the centralized control of the economy. The Urban Reform law of October, 1960, in practice left the State the real owner of all rental property and, in the rural sector, the collectives and peoples' farms were approaching the Soviet pattern.

Other Factors. The intensification of indoctrination through all possible media during work and leisure hours left the average Cuban with virtually no escape from governmental propaganda. The regime's disregard for objective justice and the rule of law, the drum-head execution of young counter-revolutionaries, and the increased virulent attacks on the Catholic church and clergy were further causes of discontent. The economic deterioration which resulted in shortages of such essentials as soaps, fats, salt, eggs, rice, and beans were adding to the general picture of unhappiness.

Position of Communist Party in Cuba

A further source of opposition to the regime was the increasing awareness that the Communist Party had in effect taken over Castro's

revolution and the regime had identified itself with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Diplomatic relations had been established with every Bloc country except East Germany; economic and trade agreements with the Bloc countries left Cuba economically dependent on the Bloc, and the shipment of Bloc military equipment (estimated at 30,000 to 40,000 tons in the fall of 1960) created further ties. The number of Bloc technical and military advisers and instructors in Cuba was reported to number at least a thousand. Cuba had signed protocols covering cultural-scientific cooperation with almost all the Bloc members, and the traffic between Cuba and the Bloc had reached considerable proportions. with several groups arriving and departing each week. Some hundred of Cuban students had left for Iron Curtain countries, and arrangements were being announced for Bloc professors to replace dismissed or resigned Cuban university professors. Cuban "front" groups (labor, student, youth, women) had established relations with their Bloc counterparts and previous ties of organizations representing these population sectors with Free World movements were dissolved.

Locale of Discontent

By February, 1961, several sources had estimated that the percentage of the population now disenchanted with the Castro regime had reached as high as 60%. The middle class, largely urban centered, offered the most nearly solid resistance to the government. It was this class that had brought Castro to power and accordingly was first aware of the dangers of the regime's political course. It was furthermore the most affected by the deteriorating economic conditions. Certain elements of the middle class--students, labor, professional, and the Catholic hierarchy--were the most active opposition.

By early 1961, the only mass support for the regime came from the lower class, both urban and rural, principally led by those who had already received or hoped to receive some benefits from the government. However, decreased wages and income even in the lower class added to the feeling of dissidence. While the lower class were not to play an active opposition role comparable to that of the middle class, their anti-regime contribution was substantial. For example, the Escambray guerrillas could not have survived as long as they did without the help of an estimated 10,000 peasant sympathizers.

Active Resistance

Guerrilla Activity. While there were many evidences of dissidence within Cuba during the early months of 1961, the most dramatic was the continuing guerrilla warfare waged against the regime by several hundred men in the Escambray Mountains. Led by [.....].... former Castro army officers, the guerrillas withheld from early December, 1960, the assault of some 40,000 Castro militiamen. Although there were few pitched battles, the siege tactics of the militia, which cut the guerrilla's supply links with civilian sympathizers resulted in such attrition that organized resistance in that area was virtually ended by mid-March, 1961. [.....]

Other guerrilla activity during this period was reported from all areas of Cuba, with the exception of the Isle of Pines. In most instances, the guerrilla bands consisted of small groups, led by former Army officers, who had deserted from garrisons and taken to the hills. The size of the groups varied from fifteen to twenty men up to a reported 800

Regardless of numbers, they were considered to be significant manifestations of discontent, since only desperate men would rebel in the face of overwhelming numerical strength of the Castro militia and in view of the fact that those who rebel on an island have no friendly border to cross when the going becomes difficult. In February, 1961, the following anti-Castro forces were reported from the various provinces:

Las Villas: 3-400 in Escambray under various leaders
100 near Corralillo
180 near Yaguajay

Camaguey: groups of unknown size near Los Negros

Matanzas: groups at Cascajal, Pedro Mayacon, and
San Jose de los Ramos
group of 80 near Jagüey Grande

Pinar del Rio: 150 in Sierra del Rosario

Oriente: 800

Habana: discussed below

These figures, it should be noted, represent the most conservative strength estimates and fall far short of the numbers frequently reported.

Activity in Habana. The chief center of anti-regime dissidence was in the city of Habana, where the leaders of the several resistance organizations maintained their headquarters. These organizations operated

separately and except for their common hatred for Castro and his henchmen had no agreed program amongst themselves. This did not prevent practical cooperation, however, and the political differences which divided the exile groups in the U.S. lost their sharpness inside Cuba. The most effective internal organizations, as judged by their ability and willingness to carry out operations were the Movimiento Recuperacion de Revolucionario (MRR), the Movimiento Democratico Revolucionario Cristiano (MDC), and the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE). The DRE was actually a branch of the MRR, and the MRR and the MDC in Habana tended to become indistinguishable from each other.

Another resistance element of significance consisted of the members of several unions. The refinery workers, bus workers, and electrical workers in particular, whose leadership had been systematically purged by the regime to make way for men more dedicated to the Communist rule.

The 700 to 1,000 active resistance fighters in Habana engaged primarily in acts of sabotage and in the dissemination of propaganda materials. The sabotage, while at times spectacular as in the burning down of the largest department store in the city and the extensive damage to a major television station, was largely of the nuisance variety and had little effect on the regime's key installations. Its counterpart in the countryside was the burning of sugar cane fields. While this was extensive, losses were minimal, since burnt cane can still be processed, and the effect was mostly psychological. Besides sabotage and some random shooting frays, there was a good deal of nuisance bombing, so much so that it came to be considered a nightly occurrence by early April, the peak of such activities.

Several attempts were made on the major power stations and the water distribution system of Habana was considerably damaged, but these had the effect of only temporary inconvenience to the regime. While none of these sabotage actions were significant in themselves, they were evidences of considerable dissidence with a potential for more meaningful action once supplies of military equipment were made available and more trained agents infiltrated. It might also be pointed out that although many of the top leaders of the internal resistance fell into the hands of Castro's G-2 at the time of the invasion, the organizations were well enough established to provide replacements for those leaders and to carry on.

Opposition organizations. A great number of resistance organizations claimed to have a following in Cuba. A compilation, dated October, 1960, revealed the existence of approximately 200 resistance groups, a great many of which were believed to be little more than paper organizations. Of those which were not, the most significant non-Batista organizations were combined in the Frente Revolucionaria Democratica (FRD), which was the chief political coalition until the formation of the Revolutionary Council led by Dr. Miro Cardona. Two organizations which made extensive claims to resistance assets within Cuba deserve special note. One, the Unidad Revolucionaria (UR) appears at this time to have based its claims on the adherence to it of the chief guerrilla leaders of the Escambray. Since those leaders were also claimed by many other organizations, the validity of the UR claim cannot be determined. The second organization, much in the recent news, was Manolo Ray's Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP), frequently referred to as the group with the best and most widespread

clandestine underground in Cuba. Whatever the truth may be on that score, the MRP failed to conduct any significant resistance activity, claimed as its own work known to have been performed by others, and passed up opportunities for concerted action. Manolo Ray reportedly once said he would prefer to save whatever assets he had for the struggle for power after Castro.

Estimated Resistance Strength

It was estimated in March, 1961, that there were from 2,500 to 3,000 persons in Cuba engaged in active resistance against the Castro regime. It was further estimated that a well-organized, well-armed force, successful in securing a lodgement on Cuban soil, would receive the active support of 25% of the Cuban populace and would be opposed, at the maximum, by no more than 20% of the people. Of the remaining 65%, the majority would adopt an attitude of neutrality until such time as there was a strong indication of which side had the better chance of victory. The figure of 2,500 to 3,000 of active fighters, it was believed, would expand at least ten times that size once the lodgement was successful to which they could rally. The word "lodgement" was used in the military sense as meaning "the occupation and holding of a position in hostile territory."


Impact of Invasion Failure

The failure of the invasion was accompanied by mass arrests, the setting-up of checkpoints, curfews, and other controls which had the effect of stifling the resistance almost entirely. Committees for the Defense of the Revolution proliferated the island. At least 50,000 persons--and some reports indicate over 200,000--were herded into prisons and concentration camps. The effect of these measures plus the psychological impact

[REDACTED]

of the failure of the invasion forces (which included the cream of the anti-Castro youth) have so demoralized the resistance that it is impossible to estimate its present strength or the time it will take to build up an effective internal force. The blatantly Communist nature of the regime as revealed in its recent announcements and repressive actions have undoubtedly aroused resentment among Cubans who heretofore were either pro-Castro or neutral. The foreign embassies and legations in Habana are bulging with persons who have sought political asylum. A key problem for the resistance in the future will be that of finding reliable anti-Castro leaders willing to remain in Cuba.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

9 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Maxwell D. Taylor
SUBJECT: Cuban Operation

1. At about 9:30 p.m. on 16 April (D-1) I was called in the CIA headquarters for the Cuban operation by the Special Assistant to the President, Mr. McGeorge Bundy. He notified me that we would not be permitted to launch air strikes the next morning until they could be conducted from a strip within the beachhead. Any further consultation regarding this matter should be with the Secretary of State.
2. I called the Secretary and asked him if I could come immediately to his office and discuss this decision. Mr. Bissell joined me at the Secretary's office where we both arrived at about 10:15 p.m.
3. The Secretary informed us that there were political considerations preventing the planned air strikes before the beachhead airfield was in our hands and usable. The air strikes on D-2 had been allowed because of military considerations. Political requirements at the present time were overriding. The main consideration involved the situation at the United Nations. The Secretary described Ambassador Stevenson's attitude in some detail. Ambassador Stevenson had insisted essentially that the air strikes would make it absolutely impossible for the U. S. position to be sustained. The Secretary stated that such a result was unacceptable.
4. In the light of this he asked that we describe the implications of the decision. We told him that the time was such (now almost 11:00 p.m.) that it was now physically impossible to stop the over-all landing operation.

as the convoy was at that time just about beginning to put the first boat ashore, and that failure to make air strikes in the immediate beach-head area the first thing in the morning (D-Day) would clearly be disastrous. I informed him that there would be four effects of the cancellation order as it applied to strikes against Cuban airfields.

a. There would be a great risk of loss of one or more of the ships as they withdrew from the beach. This would be serious but not catastrophic, provided that the unloading had proceeded as scheduled and all planned unloading had occurred by daylight. In view of the fact that this was a night landing and close timing was required, it was pointed out that the probability of smooth performance here was doubtful. (As it turned out, the unloading was not accomplished in the time planned.)

b. The disembarked forces in the beachhead would be subjected to a heavier scale of air attack than would otherwise have been the case. In view of the fact that the Cuban Air Force was inadequate for massive air attacks, the attacks to be expected under the new circumstances would be damaging to these forces but not decisive.

c. Failure essentially to neutralize the Cuban Air Force very early on D-Day would have its most serious effect on the use of the Expeditionary Air Force's B-26s to isolate the battlefield. The B-26s were being counted upon to attack approaching Cuban ground and Naval elements and close-in artillery and tanks. No fighter cover was being provided for the B-26s and they would thus face the prospect of serious attrition during these battlefield operations. The beachhead could then be overwhelmed by the superior surface attack which could be brought against it.

d. Loss of efficiency would result from this late change of orders.

5. After considering the foregoing, the Secretary of State agreed that strikes could be made in the immediate beachhead area but confirmed that the planned air strikes against Cuban airfields, a harbor, and a radio broadcasting station, could not be permitted and the decision to cancel would stand. He asked if I should like to speak to the President. Mr. Tissell and I were impressed with the extremely delicate situation with Ambassador Stevenson and the United Nations and the risk to the entire

political position of the United States, and the firm position of the Secretary. We saw no point in my speaking personally to the President and so informed the Secretary.

6. Our immediate problem then was quickly to dispatch the necessary order to the Air Base in Puerto Cabezas carrying out the instructions to stop the planned air strike and to require re-planning and re-briefing of crews. (This was barely accomplished as the order to cancel caught the crews in their cockpits.)

7. Our next task was to try and compensate for the loss of effective air strikes. In order to protect the shipping as it withdrew from the beachhead, I arranged with the Navy to stand by pending authority to give fighter cover. At 4:30 a.m., 17 April (D-Day), I called on the Secretary of State at his home and reiterated the need to protect the shipping. The Secretary telephoned the President and put me on the phone. After I made the request the President asked that the Secretary be put back on. After conversation with the President, the Secretary informed me that the request for air cover was disapproved.

C. P. Cabell
C. P. CABELL
General, USAF
Deputy Director

The foregoing conforms to my recollection:

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director (Plans)

22
3 May 1961

SUBJECT: Sequence of Events (D-2 to D+2), and Organization and Operation of Command Post.

REFERENCE: Paragraph 4, Memorandum dated 1 May 1961, Subject: Additional Information Desired of CIA.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
(D-2 to D+2)

General. The description of events set forth herein is based upon messages and other information received at Headquarters during the operation. Comments are inserted where amplifying information is considered necessary. Later debriefing of personnel who actually participated in the operation has provided more extensive information concerning the action, but the purpose of this paper is to record what was known at Headquarters at the time.

D-2 (15 April 1961).

Air Strikes.

The purpose of these air strikes was to destroy the Castro air capability, located at Campo Libertad, San Antonio de los Baños, and Santiago de Cuba. In conjunction with the air strike, one B-26 with Castro Air Force markings and piloted by a Cuban was to land at Miami with the story that he was a defector from the Castro Air Force. The purpose of the defection flight was to conceal that the air strike was launched from outside Cuba, and to attempt to obtain mass defections in Castro's Air Force.

The air strike was carried out as scheduled at dawn D-2 by 3 B-26, allocated as follows:

- 3 - Campo Libertad
- 3 - San Antonio de los Baños
- 2 - Santiago de Cuba

ATTACHMENT 10 (Part 4 Ref B)

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Initial pilot reports indicated that 50% of Castro's offensive air was destroyed at Campo Libertad, 75% to 80% aircraft destruction at San Antonio de los Baños, and that the destruction at Santiago included 2 F-26's, 1 B3-3, 1 Lodestar, and 1 T-33 or Sea Fury. Subsequent photographic studies and interpretations indicated considerably less damage.

Comment: The State Department had consistently objected to any air attacks on Cuban airfields or other targets in Cuba. Conversely, the military planners on this project had realized from the outset that complete domination of the air was vital to the success of any landing attack. Therefore, methods were sought whereby destruction of enemy aircraft could be achieved in a manner acceptable to the State Department. It was within this framework that the defection operation in conjunction with B-26 attacks on Campo Libertad, San Antonio de los Baños, and Santiago was presented to the President of the United States, who approved the proposal. It was also the understanding of the military planners, at the time that the President gave his approval, that the D-2 strikes were to be followed by strikes at dawn D-day on airfields and other military targets. The fact that air attacks on D-day were planned was specifically mentioned by the Deputy Director (Plans) when he briefed the President on the contemplated operation.

Diversionary Landing in Oriente.

A landing 30 miles east of Guantánamo by a group of 160 men, led by Nino Díaz, was planned for the night of 14/15 April. The landing had a twofold purpose: (1) to divert attention from the main landing, and (2) to organize guerrilla operations in Oriente Province.

The ship on which the force was embarked (Santa Ana) approached the landing point on schedule without interference. However, the landing was aborted. Reasons given for aborting were as follows:

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(1) Friendly beach reception party did not appear on beach. (Comment: The leader was never informed that there would be a reception party.)

(2) Reconnaissance boat was lost.

(3) Two rubber boats were lost.

When it was learned that the operation had not been conducted, instructions were issued to land the following night. The ship remained in the area, retraced its route of the day before, and made its approach without incident. However, the landing again was not conducted. Reasons given this time were as follows:

(1) Reconnaissance boat broke down.

(2) Too much time lost in retrieving the reconnaissance boat.

(3) Friendly beach reception party did not appear on the beach.

(4) Enemy activity in area was too great.

Comment: The validity of the reasons given by Diaz for not conducting the landing are questionable. Intelligence sources did not indicate that the force had been discovered by the opposition. It was finally decided at Headquarters that weak leadership on the part of Diaz was responsible for the refusal to land, and on 16 April (D-1) orders were given to this force to proceed to the Zapata area and join the main force. The Diaz group did not arrive at Zapata in time to participate in the main operation.

Brigade En Route to Objective Area.

The ships on which the Brigade was embarked were following widely separated courses to the objective area. According to reports received (later confirmed by debriefings of all ships) all ships were proceeding ahead of schedule.

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Comment: This was not considered detrimental to the security of the operation at this time because of the distance which separated the ships from the objective area.

About 1000, 15 April the Atlantico reported an automatic weapon accident in which 1 man was killed and 2 men wounded. A U.S. Navy destroyer made pick up after dark that night. Wounded were eventually evacuated to Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.

D-1 (16 April 1961).

Seaborne Movement of Brigade.

The assault shipping continued to move on separate courses toward the objective area. From position reports rendered by the various ships and the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Essex, it was determined that all the ships, except the Rio Escondido, were ahead of schedule. At about 0600, 16 April the ships were ordered to reduce speed in order to arrive at the remainder of reference points in accordance with Ship Movement Schedule (contained in Tab A to Appendix I to Annex H to the Operation Plan). Subsequent position reports indicated the ships complied with instructions.

The ships made their rendezvous with each other on time at about 1730, 16 April. They proceeded in column and made rendezvous with U.S. Navy LSD (San Marcos) about 5000 yards from Blue Beach. LCU and LCVP aboard the LSD were transferred to Cuban crews without incident between 2300 and 2400, 16 April.

Movement of Airborne Battalion from Base Camp in Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua

This movement was accomplished during the night of 15/16 April without incident. The troops were moved expeditiously from aircraft to an isolated area near the airfield, where briefings of troops and aircraft crews were conducted until time for takeoff for objective area.

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Cancellation of D-day Air Strikes.

The information on the decision to cancel planned D-day air strikes against Cuban airfields and other military targets was received at the Command Post at about 2200, 17 April.

Comment: The late hour at which this information was received made it impossible to cancel the landing, though the PM staff planners recognized the implications of such a decision. The Brigade and assault shipping were advised at this time that all Castro aircraft had not been destroyed. The Blagar (Flagship) was ordered to expedite unloading of troops and essential cargo from the Houston, Caribe, and Atlantico and send them 50 miles to sea at the earliest possible time. The Blagar and Barbara J were ordered to protect the Rio Escondido while it was being unloaded during the day. Friendly B-26's were to fly cover over the beach-head all day. It was realized at the time by the paramilitary staff that loss of ships and military supplies on board was inevitable since it was known that Castro possessed an offensive air capability which had not been destroyed.

D-day (17 April 1961).

Blue Beach

When it was discovered that resistance was to be met in the landing over this beach, the Blagar moved in close to shore and delivered gunfire support. Brigade troops commenced landing at 0100.

0115 - Brigade Commander ashore.

0300 - Unloading of troops on Caribe completed. Commenced unloading troops from Atlantico. UDT reported searching for LCU landing point.

0330 - Troops from Atlantico landing under fire.

0420 - Brigade Commander issued orders to land troops, originally scheduled for Green Beach, over Blue Beach.

- 6 -

0600 - First LCU ashore.

0630 - Enemy air attacks commence on shipping and Blue Beach

0640 - Friendly air support arrived. (There is no mention henceforth as to what this support accomplished).

0730 - Completed discharging all vehicles and tanks from LCU's.

0815 - Enemy T-33 shot down by Blagars.

- All troops ashore at Blue Beach.

0910 - Rio Escondido hit and sunk. Crew members rescued and evacuated to Blagars.

- Brigade reported Playa Giron Airstrip ready for use.

1000 - Continuous enemy air attacks forces shipping to go to sea. At 1200 headquarters issued instructions which required sailing south at best possible speed.

- As ships withdrew they continued to come under air attack.

1130 - Brigade reported had only 4 hours ammunition left. (The Brigade Commander was probably referring only to Blue Beach, because there is nothing to indicate that he was in contact with units at Red Beach or with the airborne units).

The Blagars went to sea in company with the LCU with the plan to load the LCU's and then return after dark to make delivery of supplies and ammunition. However, after loading the LCU's, there wasn't sufficient time (darkness) remaining to make the run to the Beach, unload the craft, and retire to the seaward.

In response to the Brigade Commander's request for ammunition, at 1300 Headquarters issued instructions to base

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in Nicaragua to make airdrops at head of Bahia de Cochinos and at Playa Giron. During the night of 17/18 April 1 C-54 drop was made at Red Beach and 3 C-54 drops at Blue Beach. Results of drops are not positively known due to the fact that DZ's were not lighted.

Red Beach

Nothing was reported to Headquarters on D-day concerning the landing at Red Beach. On D+1, the following was reported by the Barbara J concerning the D-day landing.

270 men with 6 - 82mm mortars, 1 - 75 RR, 2 - 57mm RR, 1 - .50 caliber MG, and 2 - 60mm mortars were landed. A report from the Barbara J (message dated 221004Z) indicates that these troops were engaged immediately.

The Houston came under air attack at about 170630, and was hit. The ship went aground sometime later (time undetermined) with about 180 men on the west side of Bahia de Cochinos--about 5 miles from the landing beach.

Airborne Landing.

No action reported to Headquarters from the field on D-day. Certain reliable sources outside the objective area indicate the landing took place about 170730R in pre-designated drop zones. Debriefing of pilots later confirmed that all landings were made except for one outpost scheduled for DZ-2.

Night Air Attacks.

Orders were issued at 1615 to bomb as many airfields as possible at night with fragmentation bombs. Three B-26 were launched for San Antonio de los Banos for these attacks but failed to find target due to haze and the fact that target was blacked out.

D+1 (18 April 1961).

At about 0730 the 2d Battalion at Red Beach reported for first time in message traffic, saying that its position could

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not be maintained without air support for more than 30 minutes.

0824 - Brigade Commander reported Blue Beach under attack by 12 tanks and 4 jet aircraft. ~~ammunition~~ and supplies requested.

(Soon after the above report, authority to use napalm was granted for use in the beachhead area).

1010 - Red Beach reported wiped out. It was learned later during debriefing of [redacted] that Deputy Brigade Commander had ordered a withdrawal to Blue Beach, which was executed in an orderly manner.

1200 - Blue Beach reported under attack by MIG-15's and T-33, and out of Tank ammunition, and almost all out of small arms ammunition also.

1600 - Essex reported long line of tanks and trucks approaching Blue Beach from east.

Enemy air attacks and shortage of ammunition continued to be reported the rest of the day. Three C-54 ~~ammunition~~ and food drops on Playa Giron were reported dropped during the night 18/19 April. One of the drops was completely successful; and the other two doubtful - one landed off the end of the runway at the airfield, and one landed in the water. No report was received as to the amount of the latter that was recovered.

Friendly air attacks, using napalm were conducted late in the day, causing undetermined damage. Pilot reports indicate many fires to the west of Blue Beach.

1800 - 1st Battalion reported under heavy artillery attack. Position indicated at this time was considerably south of the 1st Battalion planned position north and northeast of San Blas.

- Brigade Commander continued to request jet air cover, including close support and ~~ammunition~~.

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Comment: By means of a message sent from Headquarters at 2024, the Brigade Commander was informed that a C-46 with ammunition would land at the Playa Giron airfield, and would evacuate wounded. It was also recommended to the Brigade Commander that patrols armed with bazookas search out tanks and knock them out during night. Brigade commander was also informed in this message that ships would be sent in on night 19 April for evacuation if he so recommended.

2200 - Brigade Commander sent message "I will not be evacuated. We will fight to the end here if we have to."

During the night many discussions were held concerning the participation of U.S. Navy aircraft over the beachhead area. The final instruction provided for Navy CAP between 0630 and 0730 to defend "CEF against air attack from Castro forces." The aircraft were issued instructions not to seek air combat but defend CEF forces from air attack, and not to attack ground targets. As a result of these provisions, plans were made to use all available B-26 to support Brigade, while Navy was providing air protection. Later, it was reported that Cuban pilots, flying these missions aborted prior to arrival over the beachhead, and two American crews were shot down.

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D-2 (19 April 1961)

0600 - Enemy air strikes commenced.

0710 - 1430 -- Enemy commenced closing in on Brigade elements in Blue Beach sector with tanks and infantry in coordination with air attacks. From the beginning of this period, the Brigade Commander sent many frantic appeals for air cover and support to destroy enemy tanks.

Last message - "Am destroying all equipment and communications. Tanks are in sight. I have nothing left to fight with. Am taking to woods. I cannot wait for you."

Comment: Commencing early morning of 19 April, serious consideration was given to evacuating Brigade during the night 19/20 April despite the Brigade Commander's assertion that he would not evacuate. Necessary instructions were issued to move shipping closer to the Blue Beach area so that the run to the beach, re-embarkation of troops, and withdrawal to sea could be done during hours of darkness. Identification of messages sent are as follows:

Eqs. Msg. No. 4835 (OUT 7239) - 190820Z
 4839 (OUT 7269) - 191346Z
 4840 (OUT 7271) - 191358Z
 4844 (OUT 7280) - 191434Z
 4850 (OUT 7293) - 191627Z


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
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ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES OF COMMAND POST


1. The Command Post functioned in a manner similar to that of a military command post (divisional level). Representatives from the sections comprising the Paramilitary Staff operated on a 24 hour basis. Sections represented were Ground Operations, Air Operations, Maritime Operations, Intelligence, Personnel and Logistics.
2. Contact liaison was maintained with the Joint Chiefs of Staff through Lt. Col. Benjamin Tarwater (JCS Staff representative) who visited the Operations Center twice daily to obtain timely briefing notes in order to prepare and present daily JCS briefings.
3. Telephone and cable contact was maintained with Headquarters CINCLANT. Communications with the Brigade and CEF ships was via CIA communication center at the operation center building (Quarters Eye).
4. _____ Chief, Paramilitary Staff and _____ the Project Chief, were physically present at the Command Post in Quarters Eye throughout the period of operations.
5. Mr. Bissell and _____ were also immediately available for consultation throughout the operation and frequent conferences between these officials, _____ were held.
6. Decisions within the competence of CIA were immediately reached in all cases. Decisions requiring Department of Defense participation were critically delayed due to the necessity for consideration at higher levels of government and political implications.
7. During the final day of the operation, _____ and other key military staff officers posted themselves in the communications center of Quarters Eye and responded to messages coming from the field instantly upon receipt.

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23

26 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. Colonel B. W. Tarwater, USAF
J-5, OJCS

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Documents

1. Enclosed are the following documents:

Attachment A - A brief narrative of the air activity (TS-155685-A)

Attachment B - A chronological sequence of events (TS-155685-B)

Attachment C - A report [redacted] on aircraft,
crew, target and departure time (TS-155685-C)

Attachment D - Training received by the pilots

Attachment E - Support drop missions flown from D-Day
through D+2

Attachment F - A list of personnel involved in the training
of the pilots and their background (TS-155685-D)

Attachment G - Composition of base unit [redacted] This
does not include the air unit, which consisted of twenty people, the
majority of which were the Operations Staff. (TS-155685-E)

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Narrative of Air Activity

1. On 8 April 1961 a briefing was conducted for the Deputy Director (Plans), Acting Chief, WH-4, and Acting Chief, [redacted] which outlined the proposed plan of air operations for Project [redacted] and Sub-Project [redacted]. Targets were as cited in [redacted] Air Operations Plan 200-1 with the exception that Targets 1, 2, and 3 were to be struck on D-3 as a portion of Project [redacted]. Project [redacted] involved target 1, San Antonio de Los Banos, two aircraft; target 2, Campo Libertad, two aircraft; target 3, Santiago de Cuba, two aircraft.

2. On 9 April the briefing team departed Washington for [redacted]. The purpose of this trip was to brief the combat elements of the proposed plan of activities. After two days target study at [redacted] a recommendation was submitted to Headquarters which recommended assignment of three aircraft each to Targets 1 and 2. This change was effected.

3. On 15 April Project [redacted] was implemented with strikes occurring at dawn. A 24 hour delay received 13 April changed air strikes from D-3 to D-2. Results of that strike were believed to have been destruction of 70 to 80 percent of GOC's combat air capability. Damages sustained by attacking aircraft were as follows: one aircraft and crew destroyed by anti aircraft fire eventually crashing into the sea approximately 30 miles north of the Cuban coast attempting to reach Boca Chica Naval Air Station. One aircraft landed at Grand Cayman short of fuel. One aircraft landed at Boca Chica Naval Air Station, no battle damage had been incurred. The reason for landing at the Boca Chica Naval Air Station was due to this aircraft attempting to escort a crippled E-26 to Boca Chica which later crashed into the sea. The aircraft which landed at Boca Chica and Grand Cayman were eventually returned to the launch base.

4. On D-1 eleven targets were assigned the B-26 strike force designed to destroy the remainder of GOC operational air capability. Between the hours of 2100 local and 0100 local during the night 16-17 April the target assignment was changed prohibiting air strike of any airfields the morning of D day. All aircraft were committed to sustain air support over the beachhead area.

5. On D day 5 C-46's and one C-54 successfully dropped the airborne battalion at the appointed DZ's within the objective area. These aircraft returned to the launch base. B-26 aircraft were rotated over the beachhead throughout the day. The B-26 aircraft reporting the sinking of one gun boat, the destruction of one Sea Fury and one B-26, numerous strikes on ground

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TOP SECRET

targets and one C-46 aircraft by evasive attack caused an attacking Sea Fury aircraft to crash into the sea. Four B-26 were lost late on D day to enemy T-33 aircraft. One aircraft landed at Grand Cayman with one engine shot out. One aircraft landed at Boca Chica due to pilot fatigue. It should be pointed out that all Cuban air crews had at this point been up 36 to 48 hours without sleep. Thirteen (13) actual combat sorties were flown on D day. All sorties were in support of the amphibious landing on the beachhead. At this point it became clear that enemy air activity utilizing T-33 aircraft could destroy the more obsolete B-26 type aircraft with relative ease and a decision was made to attempt to destroy the remaining GOC aircraft at night on the ground through successful bombing raids. Six aircraft were scheduled to strike the main base of operations in two waves of three each during the night of 17-18 April. The aircraft aborted on take off. Heavy haze and low clouds prevented three aircraft from finding target and one aircraft attacked San Antonio de Los Banos.

6. On D plus 1 it became necessary to utilize American civilian pilots to protect the beachhead area due to the fact the Cubans were either too tired or refused to fly. Six sorties were flown during the afternoon of D plus 1. Reported damage by GOC sources indicated 1800 casualties and destruction of seven tanks.

7. On the morning of D plus 2 American pilots again were pressed into service for protection of the beachhead area for two reasons (1) the reluctance of the Cuban pilots to fly more combat sorties without air to air cover and (2) the Americans were attempting to build morale and develop a will to win. Two American crews were shot down with no survivors in the morning of D plus 2. Both aircraft were lost to T-33 aircraft. All sorties flown on the morning of D plus 2 were scheduled during the one hour period Navy air cover was supposed to have been provided the beachhead area.

8. In the afternoon of D plus 2 a radio message was received from the ground Brigade Commander stating that he was destroying his equipment and "heading for the hills". Upon receipt of this message all air activities in support of the beachhead area were terminated.

CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

<u>Time</u>	<u>Scheduled</u>	<u>Flovn</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Emerg. Base</u>	<u>Total A/C In-covrin</u>
1. Prior to D-10	15 targets scheduled 15 aircraft committed for D-Day				
2. D-10	12 targets scheduled (Deleted 9-10-11)* 14 aircraft committed for D-Day				
3. D-9	Fury Project scheduled for D-2 (8 aircraft - 3 targets)				
4. D-2 (15 April)	3 aircraft - Libertad 3 " - San Antonio Los Banos 2 " - Santiago de Cuba 1 " - Special Project	9+ (1 abort)	1 (AA)**	2	15
5. D-1	11 targets scheduled (Deleted 5-9-10-11)* 10 aircraft committed for D-Day				
6. D-1	4 targets scheduled (1-2-8-8A)* 5 aircraft committed for D-Day				
7. D-Day (17 April)	No day targets (strategic) All aircraft committed support beachhead for D-Day	13+ (1 abort)	4 (T-33's)***	3	11
8. D-Day	Max effort night attacks on air- fields 6 aircraft committed 17/18 April	4+ (2 aborts)			

* Target numbers above are listed in Appendix 2 to Annex B to Air Operations Plan No. 200-1

** Loss due to antiaircraft fire (AA)

*** Loss due to T-33 fighter aircraft

TOP SECRET

MISSION	AIRCRAFT	TARGET	ATD Z	REMARKS
	933			
NT-26-1	931	SAN ANTONIO		
	935	DE LOS BANOS	150741Z	MODERATE DAMAGE TO AIRFIELD.
	933			LANDED GRAND CAYMAN)
	935			
NT-26-2	931	CAMPO LIBERTAD	150734Z	SHOT DOWN.
	923			IN TO BOCA CHICO
NT-26-3	929	SANTIAGO	150726Z	HEAVY DAMAGE TO AIRFIELD FACILITIES.
	923	MIAMI	150726Z	
	935	SPARE		ABORT
NT-26-8	945	BLUE BEACH	170834Z	BOMBED RED BEACH NORTH
		RED BEACH		
NT-26-9	929	BLUE BEACH	170834Z	BOMBED RED BEACH UP NW ROAD
NT-26-10	985	INTERDICT SHIPPING ISLE OF PINES	170845Z	1 PB (BAIRE) SUNK AND WENT OVER RED BEACH AND KILLED 6 TRUCKS
NT-26-11	930		170845Z	1 PB (BAIRE) SUNK AND BEACH PATROL
NT-26-19	965	BLUE BEACH	171205Z	1 SEA FURY DAMAGED.
				LANDED AT GRAND CAYMAN.
NT-26-20	915	BLUE BEACH	171205Z	SHOT DOWN 1 B-26 AND 1 TRUCK. WAS SHOT DOWN, SURVIVED, JOINED BRIGADE AT BLUE BEACH. AIR LIFTED OUT 19 APR 61. CC-PILOT KILLED.
NT-26-21		BLUE BEACH	171205Z	CONTACTED TANGO - GAVE COVER TO SHIPS FOR 2 + 23 - ORD DROPPED AT SEA WHEN ATTACKED BY T-33.
NT-26-22	928	BLUE BEACH	171205Z	GOT TO BEACH BUT JETTISONED TANKS AND RF TANKS HUNG ON ROCKETS.
				DROPPED ORD IN SEA.
NT-26-23	935	BLUE BEACH	171500Z	SHOT DOWN, NO SURVIVORS
NT-26-24	967	BLUE BEACH	171500Z	LANDED GRAND CAYMAN, BOMBS AND ROCKETS DROPPED ON CIENFUEGOS AIRPORT
NT-26-25	934	BLUE BEACH	171630Z	EMERGENCY LANDING BOCA CHICO
NT-26-26	923	BLUE BEACH	171630Z	ABORT
		SAN ANTONIO	181615Z	MADE NIGHT DROP - BOMBS AND ROCKETS.
				ABORT
				ABORT

TOP SECRET

NW

NT-26-27	985	SAN ANTONIO DE LOS BANOS	172207Z	BLACKOUT AND HVY HAZE PRECLUDED MISSION SUCCESS.
NT-26-28	927		172230Z	DID NOT FIND FIELD. LANDED BOCA CHICO
NT-26-33	923	JOSE MARTI	180630Z	BLACKOUT AND HVY HAZE PRECLUDED MISSION SUCCESS
NT-26-37	945 927 960 965 950 955	BLUE BEACH	181907Z	INTERDICTED CONVOY OF TANKS AND TRUCES WEST OF BEACHHEAD.. HEAVY DAMAGE INFILCTED ON CONVOY.
NT-26-38		BLUE BEACH	191030Z 191030Z 190900Z 190900Z 190700Z 190845Z 190845Z	ENCOUNTERED CONSIDERABLE OPPPOSITION FROM AAA AND AIRCRAFT. SHOT DOWN, NO SURVIVORS " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "
NT-26-20		BLUE BEACH	171940Z 171940Z	SHOT DOWN, NO SURVIVORS " " " "

A. PILOT

B. TRAINING HOURS

C. GUNNERY SORTIES/RDS

D. ROCKET SORTIES/RX

E. BOMB SORTIES/BOMBS

F. PREV EXPERIENCE/HOURS FLYING TIME

1. THE FOLLOWING INFO ON EACH A/C COMMANDER IS KEYED AS
ABOVE AS REQUESTED PARA 1 REF.

(OPR NOTE: FILL IN THREE COLUMNS SEPERATED BY DASH)

A. B-26

A

B 130 - B 110 - B 150

C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS - C 10/2000 RDS

D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS

E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS - E 10/40 BOMBS

F 1800 MIL HRS - F 5000 MIL & CIV HRS - F 11000 CIV HRS

A

B 145 - B 100 - B 50

C 9/1900 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS

D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS

E 9/38 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS

F 11000 CIV HRS - F 5000 CIV & MIL HRS - F 4000 MIL (600-B-26)

A

B 50 - B 50 - B 60

C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS

D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS

E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS

F 3000 MIL HRS - F 3000 MIL HRS (300-B-26) - F 1200 MIL HRS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

23

61

~~SECRET~~

A B 60 - B 110 - B 110

C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS

D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS

E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS

F 1500 MIL HRS(500-B-25) - F 1600 MIL HRS(400-B-26) - B 200 MIL HRS

A

B 50 - B 120 - B 110

C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS

D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS

E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS

F 1500 MIL HRS(500 B-26) - F 2000 MIL HRS(800-B-26) - F 400 MIL HRS

A

B 90 - B 120

C 8/1800 RDS - C 8/1800 RDS

D 4/32 ROCKETS - D 4/32 ROCKETS

E 8/36 BOMBS - E 8/36 BOMBS

F 2000 MIL HRS - F 5000 CIV HRS

AMERICANS

A

B 4000 FLYING HRS - B 7000 FLYING HRS - B 6000 FLYING HRS

C 200 B-26 HRS - C 1700 B-26 HRS - C 1600 B-26 HRS

D 40 HRS THIS PJCT - D 15 HRS THIS PJCT - D 36 HRS THIS PJCT

F BLANK - F BLANK - F SHOT DOWN 19 APR 61

A

B 4000 FLYING HRS - B 2000 FLYING HRS - B 4000 FLYING HRS

C 950 B-26 HRS - C 230 B-26 HRS - C 850 B-26 HRS

D 50 HRS THIS PJCT - D 50 HRS THIS PJCT - D 80 HRS THIS PJCT

2

A [REDACTED]

B 2700 FLYING HRS - B 3000 FLYING HRS - B 2000 FLYING HRS
C 425 B-26 HRS - C 450 B-26 HRS - C. 300 B-26 HRS
D 75 HRS THIS PJCT - D 60 HRS THIS PJCT - D 75 HRS THIS PJCT
BLANK - BLANK - F SHOT DOWN 19 APR 61

A [REDACTED]

B 8000 FLYING HRS - B 16000 FLYING HRS
C 15 B-26 HRS - C 450 B-26 HRS
D 15 HRS THIS PJCT - D 200 HRS THIS PJCT

B. C-46

A PILOT
B TRAINING HOURS
C TRAINING SORTIES
D AIRDROPS-TRAINING/MISSIONS
E PREV EXPERIENCE

A [REDACTED]

B 10 - B 5 - B 10
C 20 - C 13 - C 20
D 25/6 - D 25/7 - D 20/4
E 11000 HRS - E 8500 HRS - E 4000 HRS

A [REDACTED]

B 10 - B 10 - B 10
C 20 - C 20 - C 20
D 20/4 - D 10/8 - D 25/7 **SECRET**
E 6000 HRS - E 6000 HRS - E 2500 HRS

A
B 4 - B 4 - B 4

C 8 - C 8 - C 8

D 25/3 - D 25/4 - D 25/9

E 2100 - E 1500 HRS - E 1000 HRS

~~REPORT~~

A

B 4 - B 4 - B 4

C 8 - C 8 - C 8

D 15/1 - D 15/4 - D 10/3

E 1000 HRS - E 800 HRS - E 500 HRS

C. C-54

A PILOT

B TRANSITION

C SOLO

D MISSION

A

B 10:20 - B 11:35 - B 20

C 175:55 - C 82:50 - C 79

D 11 - D 5 - D 5

A

B 3:45 - B 8:07 - B 13:20

C NONE - C 23:45 - C 4:35

D 1 - D 1 - D 3

A

B 8:50 - B 19:10 - B 14:25

C NONE - C 25:15 - C 88:00

D 2 - D 4 - D 7

~~REPORT~~

A

B 8:30 - B 10:00 - B 14:35

~~ORIGIN~~

C 5:55 - C NONE - C NONE

D 6 - D NONE - D 2

A

B 5 - B 10:55 - B 15

C 25:15 - C 24:45 - C NONE

D 2 - D 5 - D 2

A

B 2 - B 9 - B 2

C NONE - C NONE - C NONE

D 1 - D 1 - D 1(C-46)

D. C-46 AMERICANS

A

B 16000 FLYING HRS - B 8000 FLYING HRS - B 16000

C 8000 C-46 HRS - C 4000 C-46 HRS - C 8000 C-46 HRS

C-54 AMERICAN

A

B 16000 FLYING HRS - B 8000 FLYING HRS

C 4000 HRS - C 1500 C-54 HRS

A

B 16000 FLYING HRS - B 6000 FLYING HRS - B 7500 FL ING HRS

C 4000 C-54 HRS - C 2000 C-54 HRS - C 1200 C-54 HRS

B 4000 FLYING HOURS - B 6000 FLYING HRS - B 8000 FLYING HRS
C 1800 C-54 HRS - C 125 C-54 HRS - C 103 C-54 HRS

2. RE PARA 2 REF

AIR COMMANDER -

PLANS STAFF

OPS SECUR -

OPS CONNO -

CONTROL -

INTEL/PI/TGTS

OPS STAFF

CHIEF FLT OPS -

B-26 OPS -

C-54/C-46 -

AIR RESCUE -

PDO'S - WINDY

MAINT - TOFFOLO

ARMAMENT - SASSAMAN

EXPERIENCE CAN BE OBTAINED HQS ON STAFF AND AIR COMMANDER.

NAVIGATORS

CONDUCTED

MISSION NAV PLANNING WITH CUBAN NAVIGATORS.

FLYING EXPERIENCE LISTED ABOVE.

3. RE PARA 3

AMERICAN STAFF - 29

CUBAN STAFF - 16

4. CUBAN STAFF EXPERIENCE INCLUDED IN B-26/C-54/C-46

PILOT EXPERIENCE.

~~SECRET~~

1 PER REF FOLLOWING SUBMITTED:

23

(4)

- A. DATE
- B. AIRCRAFT TYPE
- C. AIRCRAFT NBR.
- D. PILOT
- E. TARGET
- F. REMARKS

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

A. 17 APRIL 1961
B. C-46
C. 855
D. [REDACTED]
E. DZ-3 AND DZ-4
F. LIGHT GRD FIRE. DZ-3. DROPS OK ON TGT

264113Z APR 61

A. 17 APRIL 61
B. C-46
C. 877
D. [REDACTED]
E. DZ3 AND DZ-5
F. DZ-3 LGT GRD FIRE. DROPS OK ON TGT. TWO FRIENDLY TANKS AND
THREE TRUCKS.

A. 17 APRIL 1961
B. C-46
C. 738
D. [REDACTED]
E. DZ-3
F. DROPS OK ON TGT.

A. 17 APRIL 61
B. C-46
C. 878
D. [REDACTED]
E. DZ1-2-3
F. DZ-1 NO DROP DUE FIGHTING. DZ-2-3 DROP OK.
JUMPED BY SEA FURY MANEUVERED IT TO CRASH IN SEA.

A. 17 APR 61

23

E. C-46

C. 864

D. []

E. DZ-1

F. DZ-1 DROP OK.

A. 17 APR 61

B. C-54

C. 7711

D. []

E. DZ-3

F. DRCP OK. AIRFIELD SURVEYED OK.

A. 18 APRIL 61

B. C-46

C. 864

D. []

E. PLAYA GIRON AIRFIELD

F. LANDING-ABORTED DUE ENEMY AIR (SEA FURIE AND T-33) AND SEARCH

AZM 18 APRIL 61

E. C-54

C. 7711

D. []

E. BLUE BEACH

F. DROP OK

A. 18 APRIL 61

B. C-54

C. 7710

D. []

E. RED BEACH

F. BROUGHT BACK 2 BUNDLES GRD FIRE ON 4TH PASS OPPOSITION IN AREA.

A. 18 APRIL 61

B. C-54

C. 7127

D. []

E. BLUE BEACH

F. DROP OK

A. 18 APRIL 61

B. C-54

C. 7711

D. []

E. BLUE BEACH

F. ABORT - DUE DAYLIGHT AND REPORTED ENEMY AIR.

A. 19 APRIL 61

B. C-46

C. UNK

D. []

E. PLAYA GIRON

F. ABORT - RECALLED DUE ENEMY AIR.

A. 19 APRIL 61

B. C-46

C. 864

D. []

E. PLAYA GIRON AIRFIELD

F. ABORT - PILOTS DISCRETION DAYLIGHT.

A. 19 APRIL 61

B. C-54

C. 7711

D. []

E. BLUE BEACH

F. ABORT - DUE ENEMY AIR. 2 B-26'S SHOT DOWN SAME TIME.

S E C R E T

~~TOP SECRET~~

TRAINING UNIT

23

~~TOP SECRET~~

PERSONNEL

I. Agency air operations (Washington)

A. Headquarters, Washington, Personnel Support

Direct - 14 total (Security, Cover, Admin, Finance, Material, 6 operations)

Indirect - All sections - Operations, Weather, Intell, Admin, Security, etc., plus facilities

Organization - Hqs. Washington
Normal

1. ~~Except~~, i.e., Operations, Materiel, Admin, etc.

Experience - Washington

1. Chief

a.

b. Operations staff all highly qualified USAF air operations officers.

c. All support chiefs [] long experienced in

B.

Total - 316 (157 Cuban, 159 American)

Organization

1. Air Unit - ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ - Chief and Deputy (20)

a. B-26 - 3 operations officers - 1 navigator

b. Transport (C-54 - C-46) - 3 operations officers - 1 navigator

c. Administration - Commo, Security

d. Maintenance

e. PDO

f. Ordnance

2. Base Unit

a. Chief of Support - Staff Employee full time. (In addition to performing functions of administering the base and its personnel, this man with the Chief of Security conducts all liaison with the local contracting firm, the docking facility, and the local officials.

b. Finance Clerk - Staff Employee full time

c. Security Staff

1 Staff Employee full time (Chief)

1 Staff Employee TDY during operational phase

8 CIA Contract Guards

Guardia Nacional (perimeter guards)

d. Supply Section

2 Staff Employees full time

1 full time position - staff employees rotated into this slot from

1 ANG tech

e. Medical Staff

1 Doctor full time; CIA contract employee; American

1 Staff Employee medical technician

f. Communications

10-12 full time Staff Employees

g. Messing Facility

4 ANG cooks

Indigenous cooks and waiters, etc.

~~SECRET~~
CIA

23 May 1961

SUPPLY DATA

SUBJECT: Prepare a short paper showing how many supplies at all places.

REFERENCE: Paragraph c. Memorandum dated 22 May 1961.

In response to the above, the appendices show supplies loaded aboard ships and at various bases.

For ready reference, a recapitulation of tonnage on each ship and at each base follows:

Rio Escondido	378.9	S/Tons
Houston	183.7	S/Tons
Atlantico	190.	"
Caribe	404.	"
Lake Charles	510.3	"
Santa Ana	23.7	
3 Landing Craft Utility	56.4	" Vehicles not incl.
Barbara J (LCI)	42.	"
Bleagor (LCI)	42.	"
Oratava	1,242.	"
La Playa	1,246.1	"
Army Ord. Depot, Anniston, Alabama	1,246.	"
Red River Arsenal and Midwest Depot (Yellow Supply Block)	607.55	"
Guatemala Training and Air Base	84.5	"
Opa Locka, Florida	565.	"
Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua	2,763.21	"
Stock Island, Key West, Florida		Data not available at present

~~SECRET~~
CIA

~~SECRET~~SUPPLIES ON RIO ESCONDIDO

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>WT. (lbs.)</u>	
I	Rations - "C" type Combat	2,500 12,000	13,488 24,000
II	General Supplies including 6 - 19' aluminum motor boats with outboard motors		50,560
III	Bulk auto gas in ship's tanks (33,586 gals.) 145 drums auto gas 55 drums aviation 23 drums of oil and greases 15 drums Diesel 6 drums premix outboard motor gas Other POL		235,102 105,000
IV	Communications, medical and other equipment		13,295
V	Small Arms Ammunition High Explosive Ammunition Pyrotechnic and Chemical Ammunition White Phosphorous Ammunition		54,778 223,855 6,473 31,253 757,804 lbs. 378.9 S/Tons

The following vehicles were aboard:

5 - 2½ Ton, 6 x 6, trucks
1 - ½ Ton truck
3 - ¼ Ton trailer
1 - 400 gal. water trailer, filled
1 - Fork lift, 3 ton capacity
1 - Communications trailer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~SUPPLIES ON THE HOUSTON

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>WT. (lbs.)</u>
I	Rations (3,660 "C")	24,160
II	General Supplies includes 6 aluminum boats w/outboard motors	15,590
III	265 drums auto gas 98 drums aviation gas 8 drums premix outboard motor gas 23 drums oil and grease 15 drums diesel fuel Other PCL	164,680
IV	50 bed hospital complete and other medical, communications equipment	103,200
V	Small arms ammunition High Explosive Ammunition White Phosphorous Ammunition Pyrotechnic and Chemical Ammunition	22,916 28,805 5,940 2.125 367,416 lbs. 183.7 S/Tons

~~SECRET~~

SUPPLIES ON THE ATLANTICO

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>WT. (lbs.)</u>
I	Rations (3,700 "C")	22,176
II	General supplies including 10 aluminum boats with motors	12,760
III	265 drums auto gas 15 drums diesel fuel 8 drums premix outboard motor fuel	115,920
IV	Communications and medical equipment	3,850
V	Small arms ammunition High Explosive ammunition Pyrotechnic and chemical ammunition White phosphorous ammunition	16,193 21,544 4,507 3,029
2,000-man Pack (includes Classes II, III, IV, and V)		<u>180.000</u> 379,979 lbs. 190 S/Tons

Atlantico carried the Brigade's
2nd communications trailer

SUPPLIES ON THE CARIBE

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>WT. (lbs.)</u>
I	Rations (2,500 "C")	21,390
II	General Supplies, includes 6 aluminum boats with outboard motors	10,530
III	256 drums auto gasoline 15 drums diesel fuel 6 drums premix outboard motorboard gas Other POL	110,800
IV	Communications and Medical	1,100
V	Small arms ammunition High Explosive ammunition White Phosphorous ammunition Pyrotechnic and chemical ammunition	26,932 28,860 5,940 2,485
	15-day supply aviation ord	<u>600,000</u> 808,037 lbs. 404 S/Tons

SUPPLIES ON THE LAKE CHARLES

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>WT. (lbs.)</u>
I	Rations (23,000 bulk - rice, dried meat beans, lard, salt) . 2,500 "C"	45,507 11,088
II	General Supplies, includes 6 aluminum boats with outboard motors	35,296
III	123 drums auto gas 55 drums avn gas 15 drums diesel fuel 27 drums oils and greases 6 drums premix outboard motor gas Other POL	90,670
IV	Communications and Medical	19,786
V	Small arms ammunition High Explosive Ammunition Pyrotechnic and chemical ammunition White phosphorous ammunition	98,278 612,834 11,120 97.066 1,020,645 lbs. 510.3 S/Tons

Vehicles on the Lake Charles:

6 - $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton Trucks
6 - $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton Trailers
1 - Fork lift, 3 ton capacity

24
~~SECRET~~

SUPPLIES ON THE SANTA ANA

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>WT. (lbs.)</u>
I	Rations - combat - 2,500 - "C" 1,460	7,100
II & IV	Communications and Medical Equipment; includes 6 landing boats and motors	12,500
III	Premix outboard fuel	2,800
V	Ammunition	<u>25,000</u> 47,400 lbs. 23.7 S/Tons

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

SUPPLIES ON 3 LCU's

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>WT. (lbs.)</u>
I	Rations (700)	4,200
II	General Supplies	8,350
III	Avn Gas and other POL	19,778
IV	Communications Equipment	3,063
	Vehicle Spare Parts	4,000
V	Small Arms Ammunition	7,816
	High Explosive Ammunition	53,470
	Pyrotechnic and Chemical Ammunition	382
	White Phosphorous Ammunition	11,738
	(Class V includes 572 rounds of 76mm tank ammunition.)	
		<u>112,797 lbs.</u>
		<u>56.4 S/Tons</u>

23.25 S/Tons was mobile loaded aboard
7 - 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton, 6 x 6 trucks

The 3 LCU's carried the following vehicles:

7 - 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T. trucks, 6 x 6, mobile loaded
with supplies

5 - M41 tanks

4 - $\frac{1}{4}$ T. trucks

1 - 3,000 gal. gasoline refueler truck carrying
avn. gasoline

1 - 400 gal. water trailer, filled

1 - D-6 tractor, with 7'10" blade

1 - Tractor crane

3 - Sled pallets loaded with 245' beach
mat.

C-157
CONFIDENTIAL